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(869) 
ARTICLE 
THE PRIVACY INTEREST IN PROPERTY 
ABRAHAM BELL† & GIDEON PARCHOMOVSKY†† 
Once upon a time, there existed a clear nexus between property and privacy. 
Protection of property rights was an important safeguard against intrusions of the 
privacy interests of owners both by the government and by private actors. Gradually, 
however, the symbiotic relationship between privacy and property has been forgotten 
by scholars and policymakers and fallen into oblivion. 
In this Article, we seek to restore the centrality of privacy in property law by 
making two novel contributions—one descriptive and one normative. Descriptively, 
we show that concerns for privacy inform, at times implicitly, many important property 
doctrines. Indeed, we show that privacy provides an indispensable compass for 
understanding and uniting diverse and seemingly unrelated property rules. Second, we 
propose how privacy concerns can be better and more explicitly incorporated into 
property law and policy. We show that attention to privacy can reinvigorate scholarly 
thinking about property and lead to new solutions to longstanding problems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Few doubt the centrality of property to Western civilization, but few agree 
on the reason for its centrality.1 
One prominent theory views property as vital for economic development. 
Property law allocates exclusive rights to resources, and thereby incentivizes their 
efficient management. This theory emphasizes property law’s grant of rights of 
exclusion to owners.2 Another prevalent set of theories portrays property as 
 
1 See generally Carol M. Rose, Property as the Keystone Right? 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 329, 333-61 
(1996) (outlining seven reasons why property should be considered a keystone right). 
2 See id. at 358-61; see also J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 103 (1997); Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 596 (2008) (arguing that “[t]he idea of exclusion, in one form or the other, tends 
to inform almost any understanding of property, whether private, public, or community”); Thomas W. 
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central to personal development or moral desert. These theories focus on the 
owner’s ability to exclude others from an asset, to set an agenda for it, and to 
control its transfer and alienation.3 Yet another influential justification for the 
centrality of property emphasizes property as the arena of accommodating both 
complementary and conflicting social impulses. Theories of this kind eschew 
simple characterizations of property and stress how much property doctrine 
should depend on changing social needs and the particulars of the case.4 
Remarkably, despite this plethora of theories justifying property, little 
attention has been paid to date to the importance of property to the maintenance 
of privacy. Privacy is highly valued in society and thus by the law. The Supreme 
Court famously recognized a constitutional right to privacy in the landmark case 
of Griswold v. Connecticut,5 and the right to privacy has continued to play an 
important role in constitutional jurisprudence until today.6 Privacy concerns have 
been highlighted in other areas of constitutional law, too, such as Fourth 
Amendment protections against unwarranted searches and seizures.7 A cluster of 
torts has also been established to develop privacy interests,8 and numerous statutes 
have been enacted to protect privacy interests in many contexts.9 Particularly in 
recent years, thanks to the development of improved communications technology, 
issues related to privacy have come to the fore in new areas of the law, where a 
 
Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 730 (1998) (“[T]he right to exclude others 
is more than just ‘one of the most essential’ constituents of property—it is the sine qua non.”).  
3 See Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. TORONTO L.J. 275, 298-99 (2008) 
(emphasizing the importance of the owner’s ability to set an agenda for an asset); Francisco J. Morales, 
Comment, The Property Matrix: An Analytical Tool to Answer the Question, “Is This Property?”, 161 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1125, 1133 (2013); see also Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL 
L. REV. 531, 541-42 (2005) (reviewing scholarly works advocating a natural right conception of property). 
See generally GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT ¶¶ 41-70 (T.M. Knox 
trans., 1967) (1821); Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
4 See Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 627-28 
(1988). See generally HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS (2011). 
5 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
6 For a discussion of constitutional treatment of the right to privacy, see Anita L. Allen, First 
Amendment Privacy and the Battle for Progressively Liberal Social Change, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 885, 
885-87 (2012) (stating how the concept of privacy plays a major role in constitutional jurisprudence); 
Thomas P. Crocker, From Privacy to Liberty: The Fourth Amendment After Lawrence, 57 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 10-15 (2009); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737 (1989); Reva B. 
Siegel, How Conflict Entrenched the Right to Privacy, 124 YALE L.J.F. 316, 316 (2015) (arguing that 
Griswold helped entrench the right to privacy in constitutional jurisprudence). 
7 See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 
(1967); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958). See also generally William C. Heffernan, Fourth 
Amendment Privacy Interests, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2001); Protecting Privacy under the 
Fourth Amendment, 91 YALE L.J. 313 (1981). 
8 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (5th ed. 1984); 
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 388-89 (1960) (dividing privacy into four distinct torts). 
9 See, e.g., Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012); Children Online Privacy Protection Act of 
1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2012); Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 
Pub L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (2) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
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heated debate exists on the appropriate relationship between privacy and property 
in information.10 Yet the role of property rights in protecting privacy in the 
physical world has played little role in property theory to date. 
This is particularly ironic in light of the history of the development of 
privacy law. It is generally acknowledged that the roots of modern 
constitutional privacy law are to be found in concepts of property. Specifically, 
privacy interests were originally thought to be defined by, and in service of, 
property rights.11 It is only with time that privacy law separated from property 
law and became a distinct legal field. Yet because privacy law has now emerged 
out of property law, theories of property law no longer seem to reflect the 
centrality of privacy. This development is regrettable. While there is little 
doubt that the new field of privacy law protects privacy interests that are 
outside the realm of property law, there is likewise little doubt that many 
privacy interests that concern us still do lie within the realm of property. 
Since the rise of legal realism12 and especially the work of Felix Cohen,13 
academic discussions of property have largely focused on the right of property 
owners to exclude others.14 Proponents of exclusion rights support their 
position by reference to the values of autonomy and efficiency.15 Opponents 
of the right to exclude, starting with the legal realists and continuing with 
 
10 For arguments for applying property-style rights in the information space, see CARL SHAPIRO 
& HAL R. VARIAN, U.S. GOVERNMENT INFORMATION POLICY 29-31 (1997); Patricia Mell, Seeking 
Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1, 26-40 (1996); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of 
Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383 (1996). For arguments against applying property-style rights in the 
information space, see Mark A. Lemley, Private Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1545, 1547-57 (2000); Pamela 
Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1151-73 (2000); cf. Abraham Bell & 
Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Information, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 237 (2016) (discussing the role 
of registries in the relationship between property and information access); Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. 
Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222, 229 (2005) (explaining the relationship between the protection of 
copyright and civil liberties in cyberspace); Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. 
REV. 159, 165 (2015) (discussing the development of the theory of informational privacy). 
11 See generally Heffernan, supra note 7, at 12-15; Note, The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century 
America, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1892, (1981). 
12 See generally Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1915 (2005); Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897); Brian 
Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND 
LEGAL THEORY 50 (W. Edmundson & M. Golding eds., 2005). 
13 See, e.g., Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. 
REV. 809 (1935). 
14 E.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1985); David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, The Right to Exclude Others from Private Property: 
A Fundamental Constitutional Right, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 39, 39-40 (2000); Joseph William Singer, 
No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1293 (1996). 
15 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004); Radhika 
Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359, 368 (2000) (discussing the right to 
exclude based on autonomy in the context of the human body). 
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progressive property scholars, buttress their position by invoking the value of 
human “flourishing.”16 Privacy appears to have fallen by the wayside, 
receiving virtually no attention from either camp. This is not only surprising, 
but also unfortunate, because privacy is paramount both to autonomy and to 
human flourishing and thus offers a common ground or a bridge between two 
of the central competing ideologies in modern property theory. More 
importantly, it offers a unique view of property as an institution and of its 
defining characteristics that has been overlooked thus far. 
In this Article, we argue for giving privacy its deserved prominence among 
the values protected by property law. We show that property law is in many 
ways uniquely placed to protect privacy, and that privacy is rightly and 
naturally protected by property law. Indeed, we show that several extant 
doctrines in property law are best understood as attempts to defend 
rightsholders’ privacy rights, even if current theorizing has failed to take notice. 
The connection between privacy and property is evident in many existing 
doctrines in property law.17 Nowhere is this effect more pronounced than in 
the context of owners’ exclusion rights. As we will show, owners’ exclusion 
powers are often implicitly correlated with their expectations of privacy. 
Owners of commercial properties who invite the public to frequent their 
establishments virtually relinquish their right to exclude. By contrast, for the 
home, where owners’ privacy interests are paramount, the right to exclude is 
at its strongest. The varying scope of a property owner’s right to exclude can 
be best explained through a privacy prism. Compare, first, the exclusion 
powers of owners of commercial properties with those of private dwellings. 
Commercial properties are often governed by civil rights acts18 and the 
modern version of the public accommodations doctrine.19 Together, these rules 
ban owners of commercial spaces that are open to the general public, such as 
hotels, shops, and restaurants, from discriminating against individual patrons 
based on race, color, religion, or natural origin.20 Owners of commercial 
properties to which the rules apply have no expectation of privacy. In fact, they 
invite the public to visit their premises. And once they have waived their 
 
16 See Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 
743, 743 (2009) (“Values promoted by property include life and human flourishing . . . .”). 
17 See infra Part III. 
18 Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606 (2012); Housing and Community 
Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3606; see also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 
88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 
Stat. 27-30 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012)). 
19 78 Stat. at 241. 
20 See supra notes 18–19; see also, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 
260-62 (1964) (holding that a motel, as a place of public accommodation, cannot exclude visitors 
based on discriminatory factors such as race). 
 
874 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 869 
expectation of privacy, the law abrogates their power to bar entry to individual 
members of the public in an invidiously discriminatory fashion.21 
Owners of private dwellings, on the other hand, can generally deny private 
individuals entry to their home for any reason, including invidious discrimination. 
The only limitation homeowners face here concerns their ability to engage in some 
kinds of commercial acts, such as leasing their premises, or advertising services 
related to the premises.22 The Fair Housing Act, for instance, mandates that ads 
for the sale or lease of private spaces not express a preference based on race, color, 
religion, familial status, or national origin. Yet even here, privacy concerns may 
prevail and allow property rightholders a broad scope of exclusionary rights. 
Consider the recent invocation of the ban on discriminatory advertising in Fair 
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com.23 There, plaintiffs claimed, 
among other things, that defendants violated civil rights rules by asking users to 
list gender and other preferences that would ordinarily be considered to violate 
the Fair Housing Act. Rejecting the civil rights claim, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, per Judge Kozinski, cautioned that government regulation of an 
individual’s ability to pick a roommate “intrudes into the home, which ‘is entitled 
to special protection as the center of the private lives of our people.’”24 The Court 
therefore ruled that indicating discriminatory preferences for roommates should 
not be considered within the scope of the civil rights acts, and should, instead, lie 
within the traditional exclusionary powers of property rightholders.25 
Taking account of privacy values in property law takes on increased importance 
and exigency, given contemporary debates related to new technologies. Just as the 
development of commercial aviation prompted a re-examination of traditional 
property doctrines such as the rules of trespass and the ad coelum doctrine,26 the 
increasing use of drones, the increased exposure of household items to the 
Internet, and proliferation of home-based information networks will press (and to 
some degree have already pressed)27 traditional property law. Privacy concerns 
must play a key role in developing the law. 
 
21 See supra notes 18–19. 
22 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012) (stating that advertisements “with respect to the sale or rental of 
a dwelling that indicate[] any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, 
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin” are illegal under the Act). 
23 666 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012). 
24 Id. at 1221 (quoting Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
25 Id. at 1223. 
26 See Chad J. Pomeroy, All Your Air Right Are Belong to Us, 13 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
277, 287-92 (2015) (discussing the reasoning behind moving air travel outside of traditional trespass 
doctrine); Note, Airplane Noise: Problem in Tort Law and Federalism, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1581, 1582 
(1961) (discussing airplane noise as a tort of trespass); see also Note, Airplane Noise, Property Rights, 
and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV 1428, 1432-37 (1965) (discussing the landowner’s right to 
compensatory and injunctive relief due to commercial flights over their property). 
27 See Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Law Abiding Drones, 16 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. 
L. REV. 385, 407 (2015) (arguing that drone operators are outside of “the aviation community’s 
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In this Article, we aim to make two contributions—one descriptive and 
one normative. Descriptively, our goal is to advance a privacy-centered 
understanding of property. We show that notions of privacy have always been 
embedded in the institution of property, even if privacy has not received the 
scholarly attention it deserves. We show how privacy concerns continue to 
animate several vital doctrines in extant law, even if the term privacy is 
insufficiently highlighted. We show that, traditionally, property rules have 
been pivotal to protecting privacy, and that privacy concerns have been 
pivotal to developing property law.28 
Normatively, we draw on our descriptive discussion to suggest how 
property doctrine should be modified to offer better protection of privacy 
interests. Specifically, we argue that the degree of protection offered to 
property rights can be modified to reflect privacy interests. Likewise, we show 
that remedies for violations of the prerogatives of property rightsholders, even 
in ordinary civil property law, can and often should be scaled to the degree of 
interference with the rightholder’s legitimate expectation of privacy. 
One important reference for our work is contemporary jurisprudence about 
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The case law has 
rejected a simple approach under which any breach of traditional property rights 
is considered an unreasonable search and has instead often focused on the 
aggrieved’s reasonable expectations of privacy. Modern Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has thus charted an uncertain course between asset-based 
conceptions of constitutional protections and those based on privacy expectations. 
We illustrate the lessons that property law can learn from the successes and 
failures of Fourth Amendment case law in developing a modern approach to 
property-based privacy protections. A privacy-based property regime would give 
extra protection to assets in which the owner has a greater privacy expectation, 
such as the home, computers, and cellular devices. After illuminating how our 
vision can refocus and reshape property doctrine, we explain how it fits within 
 
culture of compliance”); Pierce Giboney, Note, Don’t Ground Me Bro!: Private Ownership of Airspace 
and How it Invalidates the FAA’s Blanket Prohibition on Low Altitude Commercial Drone Operations, 67 
FLA. L. REV. 2149, 2152 (2015) (discussing ownership of superadjacent airspace in the context of 
drones); see also Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2211-13 (2004) 
(proposing four legal approaches to protecting information networks); Pomeroy, supra note 26, at 
292 (arguing that drones do not typically fall into the exception to trespass that was designed for 
aircraft). See generally Greg Lastowka, Decoding Cyberproperty, 40 IND. L. REV. 23, 23-43 (2007) 
(discussing the creation and expansion of the cyberproperty legal theory). 
28 Notably, we do not intend to venture into the debate about the need to recognize rights to 
personal information as “property.” This debate lies outside the ken of our article, and we do not 
wish to contribute to the vast literature it has spawned. See e.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael 
L. Katz, Privacy, Property Rights and Efficiency: The Economics of Privacy as Secrecy, 4 QUANTITATIVE 
MARKETING & ECON. 209, 210 (2006); Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: 
An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383-84 (1996). 
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the broader framework of property theory by juxtaposing it with leading property 
theories that predominate the scholarly discourse. 
Before we proceed, several clarifications are in order. We do not argue that 
protection of privacy is the sole justification for the institution of property. We 
readily acknowledge that property law serves other purposes. Private property 
rights are important to induce optimal investment in and management of 
assets, as several prominent theories have argued.29 We are also mindful of the 
work of other influential scholars who have advanced broad and multifaceted 
theories of property; we have no argument with them either. We acknowledge 
too that the totality of extant privacy law cannot be incorporated en masse into 
property law. Our aim in this Article is not to discredit extant theories of 
property, nor is it to elevate privacy above all other interests advanced by 
property, nor to subordinate privacy law to property law. Our project is much 
more modest: we wish to reinstate privacy’s pride of place in the law of property 
and restore property law’s sensitivity to privacy interests both when it defines 
the scope of property rights and when it seeks to defend them. 
Likewise, our account should not be read to negate property protection to 
possessions without a heightened privacy interest. No such negative inference 
should be made. An article of clothing on public display or an unfenced front 
lawn are still private property, even if the owner has no expectation of privacy. 
In our approach to property law, those assets would, of course, still be considered 
property and still be entitled to protection by law. But the protection granted to 
them would be narrower in scope and weaker in magnitude than that granted to 
assets that owners associate with their privacy interest. 
With these caveats in mind, we present our argument as follows. In Part 
I, we review the historical roots of the right to privacy. We show that the roots 
of the right to privacy can be traced back to the domain of private law, and 
that it was derived from, among other things, property doctrines. In Part II, 
we turn our attention to the Fourth Amendment to gain a better 
understanding of the relationship between property and privacy. In Part III, 
we discuss extant property doctrines that embody and protect privacy 
expectations, with a focus on highlighting how privacy concerns already play 
a role in the law. In Part IV, we develop a normative account of property law 
that is centered around protection of privacy and explore its implications for 
property policy and scholarship alike. In Part V, we explore the interface 
between the privacy-based conception of property and other influential 
property theories. A short conclusion ensues. 
 
29 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 355-59 
(1967). See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2004). 
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I. PROPERTY THEORIES AND PRIVACY 
In this Part, we lay the theoretical groundwork for our analysis by looking 
at the development of privacy law, both within and without the law of 
property. We begin with a preliminary matter, by looking more broadly at the 
world of property theory. 
A. Extant Property Theories 
The institution of private property has preoccupied philosophers, legal 
thinkers, and economists since antiquity. Unsurprisingly, multiple theories 
have been advanced to justify its existence. Existing justifications of the 
institution of property can be divided into two broad categories: 
nonutilitarian and utilitarian. As we will show, while the world of property 
theory is rich and fascinating, none of the major theories of property are 
centered, or even related, to the notion of privacy. 
We begin our exegesis of the world of property theories with Aristotle. 
Aristotle justified the notion of private property, and in particular, the right 
to exclude, by reference to individual virtue. He explained that individual 
owners can only signal their virtue by waiving their right to exclude and 
allowing others to come on their property if the law provides the backdrop of 
a general norm of exclusion.30 For him, private property served an important 
general condition that helped separate virtuous owners from nonvirtuous ones. 
Another philosophical investigation aimed at justifying the existence of 
private property is found in the work of John Locke. Locke’s theory, which 
remains immensely influential to this day, relied on desert, or more specifically 
labor, as the key principle that supports recognition of private property rights 
in objects. In his theory, the laborer earns a superior entitlement to unowned 
external resources when the laborer mixes effort with those resources by dint 
of the labor investment the laborer has made.31 Importantly, John Locke 
appeared to adopt two different senses of property in his writings—a narrow 
one that corresponded closely with traditional understandings of the term, and 
 
30 ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS ¶ 5, at 25-29 (Stephen Everson ed., 1988). 
31 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT ¶ 27, at 17 (Thomas P. Peardon 
ed., 1952) (1690). As Locke famously wrote, 
[E]very man has a property in his own person: this nobody has any right to but himself. 
The labor of his body and the work of his hands . . . are properly his. Whatsoever then 
he removes out of the state that nature has provided and left it in, he has mixed his 
labor with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. 
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a broader one, in which Locke included such abstractions as liberty.32 This 
broader conception, however, is generally not used by modern theorists. 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,33 and contemporary theorists such as 
Margaret Radin,34 connected private property rights to human personhood, 
suggesting that humans need material assets through which to reflect their 
personalities and to achieve self-actualization. Hegel’s work highlighted the link 
between property and the self. To Hegel, property constituted the mechanism 
by which humans achieve self-actualization. He believed that the human will 
requires material objects to manifest itself and that without them individual 
freedom could not exist.35 Property, Hegel wrote, “is the means by which I give 
my will an embodiment.”36 More generally, he believed that one “has as his 
substantive end the right of putting his will into any and every thing and thereby 
making it his, because it has no such end in itself and derives its destiny and soul 
from his will. This is the absolute right of appropriation . . . over all ‘things.’”37 
Yet neither Hegel nor the scholars that have followed in his footsteps placed any 
emphasis on the importance of privacy. 
Moving to the utilitarian side of the ledger, the English legal philosopher 
Jeremy Bentham argued that private property is a necessary condition for 
maximizing human happiness.38 Bentham’s account of property was primarily, 
albeit not exclusively, positive. He rejected the notion that the right to property 
was a natural right. Still, he has claimed that, as a general matter, the law ought 
to protect individual expectations.39 Thus, he resisted the idea of property 
redistribution as it upset the ability of owners to come up with “a general plan 
of conduct.”40 Bentham’s theory neglected the expectation of nonowners. Nor 
did he make a real attempt to inquire how individual expectations are shaped. 
Contemporary utilitarian theorists have developed a more complete 
account of the relationship between private property and social welfare by 
 
32 Id. ¶ 6 at 5-6; see also Henry Moulds, Private Property in John Locke’s State of Nature, 23 AM. J. ECON. 
& SOC. 179, 188 (1964) (describing Locke’s theory “that property, broadly conceived, is anything that is one’s 
own—life and liberty as well as the tangibles that too often engross the attention of modern man”). 
33 See HEGEL, supra note 3. 
34 Radin, supra note 3, at 957 (laying out a personhood theory of property which requires 
control over resources in a person’s environment in order for self-development to occur). 
35 HEGEL, supra note 3, at ¶¶ 39-45. 
36 Id. ¶ 46(a). 
37 Id. ¶ 44. 
38 See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE (1830). Bentham also 
analyzed property rights in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 41-59 (C.B. 
Macpherson ed., 1978). The best edition is that contained in JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF 
LEGISLATION (C.K. Ogden ed., 1931). 
39 NONSENSE UPON STILTS: BENTHAM, BURKE AND MARX ON THE RIGHTS OF MAN 53 
(Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987) (“Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, 
rhetorical nonsense, nonsense upon stilts.”). 
40 BENTHAM, supra note 38, at 111. 
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tying the concept of private property to efficient use and management of 
resources. Harold Demsetz, in a pathbreaking article, powerfully argued that 
private property rights lead to efficient use of resources by internalizing all 
marginal costs and benefits in the hands of a single owner.41 Comparing an 
open-access regime to one of private property rights with a single owner, 
Demsetz showed that the former reduces the value of resources by 
encouraging their overuse and depletion, while the latter induces optimal 
utilization.42 Open-access regimes enable users to enjoy the full benefit they 
can derive from a resource—be it a forest, a park, an ocean fishery, or a city 
street—without taking full account of the cost created by their depletion of 
the asset. Realizing this potential, users will exploit assets to their full ability, 
even if this means that the resource will ultimately be ruined. This dynamic 
results in what Garret Hardin famously described as “the tragedy of the 
commons.”43 Formalizing private property rights in a resource in the hands of 
a single owner avoids this gloomy outcome. When all rights to a resource are 
held by a single individual, that individual not only enjoys the full value that 
can be derived from a resource, but also bears the full cost that her decisions 
impose on the resource. Overexploitation or mismanagement reduce the value 
of the resource to its owner and thus the owner will try to avoid them. 
Refining the Demsetzian insight, Steven Shavell proposed that private 
property rights lead to efficient investment of labor in resources.44 While 
Demsetz emphasized the value of resources, Shavell focused on the 
investment decisions of asset owners. Ultimately, however, both accounts 
focus on value maximization and the efficiency created by concentrating 
ownership of an asset in the hands of a single owner. 
A radically different vision of property can be found in the work of the 
group of scholars, who view themselves as advancing a vision of “progressive 
property.” The progressive property scholars, who include Greg Alexander, 
Joseph Singer, Eduardo Penalver, Laura Underkuffler,45 Hanoch Dagan,46 and 
Jedidiah Purdy,47 suggest that property, like all other legal institutions, should 
 
41 See generally Demsetz, supra note 29. 
42 Id. at 356. 
43 Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). 
44 See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 20-21 (2004). 
45 Gregory S. Alexander et al., A Statement of Progressive Property, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 743 
(2009). For criticism, see Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of Progressive 
Property, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 108, 145 (2013). 
46 See generally HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND 
RETHINKING PRIVATE LAW THEORY 164-65 (2013); DAGAN, supra note 4. 
47 JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE 
LEGAL IMAGINATION (2010); Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the 
Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047 (2007). Purdy does not see himself as a 
member of the “progressive property” movement despite his critique of exclusion essentialism. See 
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be designed to promote human flourishing, which they view as a broader 
concept than “utility” as the expression is used by utilitarians and economists. 
The progressive property scholars argue that property protection should be 
focused not solely on the interests or personality of owners, but rather on 
broad societal goals including those of nonowners that are sometimes at odds 
with the interests of the owners. So there can be no single sacrosanct principle 
or guideline that can guide policymakers.48 
To be sure, scholars occasionally recognize the importance of property rights 
to protecting privacy. Perhaps the most outstanding example of that recognition 
is from Jeremy Waldron. Waldron notes that property can serve many purposes, 
including “privacy and free trade,”49 and he observed that the right to exclude, in 
particular, helps create a “realm of private freedom . . . where [one] can make 
decisions about what to do and how to do it, justifying these decisions if at all 
only to [one]self.”50 Waldron added that individuals “need a refuge from the 
general society of mankind[,] . . . a place where they can be assured of being 
alone . . . or assured of the conditions of intimacy with others . . . .”51 
Astoundingly, Waldron’s observation on privacy has not seemed to have 
struck deep roots in the theoretic property literature. Despite the linguistic 
family resemblance between “private property” and “privacy,” a privacy-based 
justification of private property is nearly absent from the modern literature 
and scholarly debates. It was not always like this. As we will show, historically, 
the right to privacy was intricately related to the concept of property. In fact, 
originally, privacy rights were seen as derivative of private law.52 In recent 
years, however, the right to exclude has become the focal point of scholarly 
debates, and the right to privacy has fallen to the wayside. One can argue of 
course that the right to privacy is subsumed in the right to exclude. Strong 
protection of the owner’s right to exclude invariably protects her privacy 
interests.53 But this argument misses the point. The right to exclude is 
generally couched and defended in utilitarian terms.54 Detractors of the right 
 
Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1030-32 (2011) 
(understanding Purdy’s views within the context of pluralistic values in property law). 
48 Alexander, supra note 47. 
49 JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 412 (1988). 
50 Id. at 295. 
51 Id. at 296. 
52 Alexander, supra note 47. 
53 See Nita A. Farahany, Searching Secrets, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1239, 1243 (2012) (“The Court has 
recognized Fourth Amendment privacy interests that are best described as arising from the rights 
of individuals to exclude others . . . .”). 
54 As Demsetz states, “The resulting private ownership of land will internalize many of the external 
costs associated with communal ownership, for now an owner, by virtue of his power to exclude others, can 
generally count on realizing the rewards associated with husbanding the game and increasing the fertility 
of his land.” Supra note 29, at 356. Demsetz concluded that “[t]his concentration of benefits and costs on 
owners creates incentives to utilize resources more efficiently.” Id. But see ARISTOTLE, supra note 30, at 
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to exclude rest their case on distributive-justice and social-justice theories.55 
Privacy considerations are entirely missing from the exchange. This is truly 
unfortunate. As the debate currently stands, no common ground exists 
between the two main camps of the debate. Each side rests its case on 
different and largely incommensurate philosophies. Introducing privacy into 
the discussion has the potential to bridge the competing views of property. 
B. The Emergence of Privacy Law from Property 
Privacy law was unknown until the nineteenth century. This is not to say 
that privacy was not protected by law. The law protected many privacy 
interests, but the main bulwark for privacy protection was found in legal 
protection of property rights. As far back as 1499 or 1506,56 one can find legal 
expression of the English maxim that “a man’s house . . . [is] his castle.”57 Even 
as the law provided for a handful of other legal tools for protecting privacy 
interests—such as a tort against “eavesdropping”58—the primary means for 
protecting privacy interests remained the protection of private property 
against intrusion, with force if necessary.59 Blackstone wrote that the law has 
“so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man’s house that it 
stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity.”60 
Several developments, from the growth of government records and the 
invention of the telegraph to the development of the modern newspaper led 
to increasing legal attention to privacy interests.61 Yet the strands only 
coalesced into a new law of privacy with the appearance of Louis Warren’s and 
Samuel Brandeis’s famous 1890 article arguing that the common law protects 
a right to privacy.62 Even though Warren and Brandeis cast their argument in 
descriptive terms, Roscoe Pound described the article as revolutionary.63 
 
26-27 (justifying the right to exclude by reference to virtue); JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 295 (1988) (justifying the right to exclude on the basis of both liberty and privacy); 
Balganesh, supra note 2, at 620 (justifying the right to exclude on the principle of inviolability). 
55 See Alexander et al., supra note 16, at 1023-24. 
56 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 316 (J.H. Baker ed., 1978); see also The Right to 
Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, supra note 11, at 1894 n.18 (1981); Daniel J. Solove, A Brief History 
of Information Privacy Law, in PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY §§ 1–2 (Kristen J. Mathews ed., 2016). 
57 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *223. 
58 See id. at *168-69 (defining the offense as “listen[ing] under walls or windows, or the eaves of 
a house, to hearken after discourse, and thereupon to frame slanderous and mischievous tales . . . .”); 
The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, supra note 11, at 1896 & n. 32. 
59 The Right to Privacy in Nineteenth Century America, supra note 11, at 1898. 
60 BLACKSTONE, supra note 57, at *223; see also Solove, supra note 56, at 1-4. 
61 Id. 
62 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 195 (1890). 
63 Letter from Roscoe Pound to William Chilton (1916), in A. MASON, BRANDEIS: A 
MAN’S LIFE 70 (1956). 
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Warren and Brandeis advanced a conceptualization of privacy that has 
since then widely become known as “the right to be let alone.”64 Warren and 
Brandeis suggested that the right to privacy protected a person’s choice to 
reveal or refuse to reveal information about one’s “private life, habits, acts, and 
relations” to others.65 Protection of that information, according to Warren and 
Brandeis, was essential to upholding individual self-esteem.66 Constructing 
their case along the private–public divide that was extremely influential then, 
Warren and Brandeis contended that legal recognition of the right to privacy 
confers upon individuals the “power to fix the limits of the publicity which 
shall be given them.”67 To Warren and Brandeis, the right to privacy was 
“essential to that aspect of individualism which involved the individual’s 
affirmative capacity for self-determination, autonomy, and human dignity.”68 
Warren and Brandeis argued that a person’s self-esteem is affected when 
information about that person is shared with others nonconsensually. 
The core project of Warren and Brandeis was to identify doctrines from 
various legal domains that effectively protect privacy interests, and, 
moreover, that formal legal recognition of the right to privacy as a protected 
interest is a natural next step. Importantly, Warren and Brandeis did not seek 
to conjure up the right to privacy out of thin air. Rather, they contended that 
the common law encompasses a right to privacy and scoured its different 
domains to substantiate their claim. 
In addition to establishing a case for granting protection to privacy, they 
attempted to place the right to privacy in a broader jurisprudential vision. 
Thus, “[t]hey placed the right to privacy within the more general category of 
the individual’s right to be let alone. The right to be let alone,” Dorothy Glancy 
explains, “was itself part of an even more general right, the right to enjoy life, 
which was in turn part of the individual’s fundamental right to life itself.”69 
“The right to life,” Glancy continued, “was part of the familiar triad of 
fundamental, inherent, individual rights reflected in the [F]ifth [A]mendment 
to the United States Constitution: ‘No person shall . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .’”70 
 
64 Dorothy Glancy suggested that the term owes its origin to Thomas Cooley who used it in 
his TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1st ed. 1879). See Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of 
the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 3 n.13 (1979). 
65 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 62, at 216. 
66 Id. at 197. 
67 Id. at 198. 
68 Glancy, supra note 64, at 24. 
69 Id. at 3. 
70 Id. 
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Importantly, for our purposes, Warren and Brandeis were careful to 
distinguish between privacy and property.71 To them, property centered on 
“every form of possession—intangible as well as tangible,” and was therefore 
concerned with material well-being.72 Privacy, by contrast, focused on a person’s 
inner self and her psychological well-being. The conception of privacy that 
emerges from Warren’s and Brandeis’s article is deeply rooted in the concept of 
individualism. Privacy, to them, was an important attribute of individualism and 
a necessary legal construction for the protection of it.73 As commentators have 
pointed out, the conception espoused by Warren and Brandeis was heavily 
influenced by the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, who used the centrality of 
solitude for cultivating individualism.74 Emerson, however, did not focus his 
attention on privacy. Warren and Brandeis believed that although solitude was 
an important aspect of privacy, it did not exhaust all human conditions covered 
by the term. Privacy also covered voluntary social interactions with others. 
Solitude and privacy overlapped only if an individual chose to be alone. 
Warren and Brandeis sought to add a practical dimension to the discussion 
of privacy by emphasizing the importance of legal protection. They maintained 
that privacy should receive legal protection against the government and private 
parties alike. This was a key innovation of their famous article; until then, the 
predominant view among scholars was that privacy protection avails only against 
the government.75 Warren and Brandeis rejected this view, contending that the 
distinction between governmental and nongovernmental bodies should be 
abandoned: “The common law has always recognized a man’s house as his castle, 
impregnable, often, even to its own officers engaged in the execution of its 
commands. Shall the courts thus close the front entrance to constituted 
authority, and open wide the back door to idle or prurient curiosity?”76 
As important, in keeping with their ambition to establish legal protection 
for a right to privacy, Warren and Brandeis also discussed the remedial aspects 
entailed by their quest. They argued that violations of the right to privacy 
should be penalized by a wide range of remedies, from monetary damages, 
through injunctions, to criminal sanctions.77 
While Warren’s and Brandeis’s article has been extremely influential, it 
has had two side effects that are significant to property law. First, Warren and 
 
71 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 62, at 213 (“[T]he principle which has been applied to protect 
these rights is in reality not the principle of private property. . . . The principle which protects personal 
writings and any other productions of the intellect or of the emotions, is the right to privacy . . . .”). 
72 Id. at 193, 197. 
73 Id. at 196 (“[S]olitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual . . . .”). 
74 Glancy, supra note 64, at 26. 
75 Id. at 29. 
76 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 62, at 220. 
77 Id. at 219. 
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Brandeis severed the tie between property and privacy. They advanced a 
conception of privacy that is independent of traditional understandings of 
property. By unmooring privacy from property, they made a case for privacy 
protections in areas devoid of property interests. This, in turn, expanded the 
reach of privacy protection, but left it unmoored—vague and ambiguous in 
its ultimate scope and ambitions. 
Second, and relatedly, privacy law following Warren and Brandeis has 
become very broad and muddled. Privacy interests are protected today in 
several constitutional doctrines, in several torts, and in dozens of statutes 
protecting specific privacy interests and types of information. The privacy 
interest is invoked in reference to such disparate topics as criminal procedure, 
contraception and medical-information technology, with no perceived need 
for a unitary theory of privacy, the nature of people’s interest in privacy or a 
particular body of law with which to protect privacy. 
II. PRIVACY IN CONSTITUTIONAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW 
In the century since Warren and Brandeis wrote for recognizing a right to 
privacy, privacy rights have appeared in many areas of the law. Indeed, the 
mushrooming of privacy rights has led some scholars to throw up their hands, 
labeling the right of privacy “chameleon-like,” “vague and evanescent,” “protean,” 
and ultimately “about everything, and therefore . . . nothing.”78 Several torts have 
been identified as sounding in privacy,79 and dozens of statutes protect privacy 
interests through regulatory schemes and private rights of action.80 The statutes 
cover such varied topics as medical information,81 consumer information,82 
government surveillance,83 bank records,84 and searches of students at school.85 
Very few of the new privacy rights resemble property rights. Privacy rights 
in information, for instance, are not constructed like intellectual property rights, 
 
78 Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 479-80 (2006). 
79 See Prosser, supra note 8, at 388-89 (identifying the privacy-related torts of appropriation, 
unreasonable intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, and false light in the public eye). 
80 See generally Solove, supra note 56. 
81 See Health Information Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 264, 
110 Stat. 1936, 2033-34 (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.) (creating data-security 
standards to safeguard medical information). 
82 See, e.g., Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (regulating the collection of 
consumer credit information). 
83 See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline 
Over Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 50 
U.S.C.) (reauthorizing and reforming government surveillance programs); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) of 1978, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885c (2012) (regulating the collection of foreign intelligence). 
84 Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2012). 
85 Family Education Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012) (also known as 
the “Buckley Amendment”). 
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nor like traditional property rights. Still, some areas of privacy law have 
developed near property law. In this Part, we look at one particular area of 
privacy law—that developed in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence about the 
constitutionality of searches and seizures. Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is 
particularly important for us because it was traditionally oriented around 
property, and it has struggled for decades to develop a stable model for 
incorporating privacy concerns. The lessons of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence are thus vital for crafting a privacy-oriented view of property law. 
A. Privacy, Property, and the Fourth Amendment 
 While privacy-oriented interpretations of property law are the exception 
rather than the rule these days, in at least one area of the law—the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches—privacy has become a 
dominant ingredient in judicial interpretations of the scope of legal protections. 
The relevant part of the Fourth Amendment for our discussion is its 
guarantee of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by state actors. 
On its face, the protection of the Fourth Amendment appears to be limited to 
certain kinds of physical objects. The relevant part of the constitutional text states 
that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”86 One 
might read this as stating that a search can only be unreasonable if it interferes 
with the possession of houses, papers, and effects, or if it is conducted on the 
body of a person. And, indeed, until fifty years ago, the Fourth Amendment’s 
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures was held to set out a rule 
protecting “constitutionally protected” areas or objects against certain kinds of 
physical invasions or interferences.87 The Fourth Amendment, in other words, 
was thought to protect possession of the material and the tangible. 
Take the 1928 Supreme Court decision Olmstead v. United States.88 There, 
the Court had to consider whether Ralph Olmstead’s constitutional rights had 
been violated when his home had been electronically wiretapped.89 Olmstead 
had been accused of engaging in commerce of alcoholic beverages in violation 
of the Volstead Act; Olmstead’s defense was that the damning evidence had 
been collected in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s protection against 
 
86 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
87 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (“[T]he correct solution of Fourth 
Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase ‘constitutionally 
protected area.’”); see also Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966) (stating that while the 
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88 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
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unreasonable searches and seizures.90 Anticipating the Court’s later 
endorsement of the Exclusionary Rule, Olmstead argued that using this 
evidence against him was unconstitutional.91 The Court avoided the questions 
about excluding evidence by ruling that the search had comported with the 
Fourth Amendment. “The Amendment itself,” the Court said, 
shows that the search is to be of material things—the person, the house, his 
papers, or his effects. The description of the warrant necessary to make the 
proceeding lawful is that it must specify the place to be searched and the 
person or things to be seized.92 
Contrasting wiretapping with forbidden seizure of sealed letters in the 
mail, the Court emphasized the importance of focusing on things. 
There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the 
use of the sense of hearing, and that only. There was no entry of the houses or 
offices of the defendants. By the invention of the telephone 50 years ago, and its 
application for the purpose of extending communications, one can talk with 
another at a far distant place. The language of the amendment cannot be 
extended and expanded to include telephone wires, reaching to the whole world 
from the defendant’s house or office. The intervening wires are not part of his 
house or office, any more than are the highways along which they are stretched.93 
It was not until the landmark 1967 decision of Katz v. United States94 that 
the Supreme Court changed the emphasis of constitutional search and seizure 
law from the physical invasion of spaces or seizure of things to interferences 
with individual expectations of privacy. In Katz, the Court had to determine 
whether eavesdropping on conversations taking place in a public telephone 
booth constituted an unreasonable “seizure.”95 Under the rule of Olmstead, the 
case would be easily resolved for the prosecution, because the public telephone 
booth was a public place, and no things had been taken. But the Court chose a 
different approach. Rejecting the theory that the case turned on an analysis of 
the amount of constitutional protection extended to the physical space within 
telephone booths, the Court stated that the real issue was the suspect’s aim of 
protecting his privacy in the booth. Ruling that the suspect sought to exclude 
the “uninvited ear” when he occupied the telephone booth, closed the door, and 
inserted his coin to pay for the telephone call, the Court determined that one 
 
90 Id. at 455-57. 
91 Olmstead claimed that using the evidence would violate his Fifth Amendment rights against 
self-incrimination. Id. at 455. 
92 Id. at 464 (emphasis in original). 
93 Id. at 464-65. 
94 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
95 Id. at 353-54. 
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“who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll 
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he 
utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world” even if the booth 
itself is a public place.96 Explicitly rejecting both Olmstead and what it called 
the “narrow view” that Fourth Amendment protections focus on “tangible 
items,”97 the Court stated that it should be clear that “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people—and not simply ‘areas’ [or things]—against unreasonable 
searches and seizures . . . . Wherever a man may be, he is entitled to know that 
he will remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”98 
Today, it is well established that “[a] ‘search’ [for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment] occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared 
to consider reasonable is infringed.”99 The focus of the law of unreasonable 
searches has thus moved from a focus on the nature of the object to the nature 
of the possessor’s expectation of privacy. 
Recent cases illustrate the importance of this change. Consider the 
Supreme Court’s approach to aerial surveillance in California v. Ciraolo.100 
Police had rented a private airplane and, without first obtaining a search 
warrant, flew over the defendant’s land to determine whether he was growing 
marijuana on the premises.101 Having seen and photographed marijuana 
plants from the air, the police then sought and obtained a search warrant, and 
raided the grounds, seizing seventy-three marijuana plants.102 The defendant 
argued that the overflight was an unreasonable “search.”103 
Had the Court focused on physical spaces or tangible objects, it would 
have had to determine whether the air space above private land was within 
the scope of the property interest in the land, and therefore protected from 
unreasonable searches just like the land. But in the post-Katz world, the scope 
of the property right in land was irrelevant. The true question for the Court 
was whether the defendant had an expectation of privacy for the particular 
kind of observation by which the search was conducted. Thus, the Court 
analyzed not whether the defendant viewed the garden as a private space—in 
light of the ten-foot walls surrounding the area, it was clear that the defendant 
viewed the area as private104—but, rather, whether the defendant had 
 
96 Id. at 352. 
97 Id. at 353. 
98 Id. at 353, 359. 
99 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
100 476 U.S. 207 (1986). 
101 Id. at 209. 
102 Id. at 209-10. 
103 Id. at 212. 
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and desire to maintain privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits . . . . It can reasonably be assumed 
that the 10-foot fence was placed to conceal the marijuana crop from at least street-level views.”). 
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manifested an intent to shield the plants from aerial observation.105 The 
Court determined that the defendant had no reasonable expectation of 
privacy and the search was thus reasonable.106 According to the Court, “[t]he 
observations by Officers Shutz and Rodriguez in this case took place within 
public navigable airspace . . . . Any member of the public flying in this 
airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers 
observed.”107 “On this record,” the Court continued, “we readily conclude that 
respondent’s expectation that his garden was protected from such observation 
is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor.”108 
Another interesting example is the Court’s decision in Riley v. California.109 
Riley had been stopped by a police officer for driving with expired registration 
tags and was discovered to have a suspended driver’s license.110 In a search of 
the vehicle incidental to the traffic stop, the officer found two guns concealed 
under the car’s hood, leading to Riley’s arrest.111 The arrest, in turn, led the 
police to search Riley’s pockets, where an officer found a smart phone.112 The 
smart phone contained evidence that Riley was a member of the Bloods street 
gang.113 Riley sought to exclude the evidence from the phone.114 While 
acknowledging the officer’s right to search Riley’s pockets incidental to the 
arrest, and therefore to seize objects in his pockets including the phone, Riley 
argued that the data in the phone was protected against a warrantless search.115 
The Court agreed. Noting that “[c]ell phones . . . place vast quantities of 
personal information literally in the hands of individuals,” the Court held that 
the digital content on cell phones was protected from warrantless search, even 
when the physical phone itself could be taken without a warrant.116 
Yet even as the jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment has shifted its focus 
from tangible things to abstract expectations of privacy, it has ultimately 
remained bound to the physical. In several cases, the Supreme Court has 
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rejected the idea that expectations of privacy relate purely to information, 
without connection to the physical location where the information is produced. 
Consider Kyllo v. United States,117 where the Court had to determine 
“whether the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a 
public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a 
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”118 Danny Kyllo had 
grown marijuana illegally in his home, using high-intensity lamps in place of 
sunlight.119 The thermal-imaging devices detected the high amount of heat 
produced in the home by the lamps, and police used the results of the scans to 
get a search warrant, enter the home, and seize over one hundred plants.120 
The scanning itself, however, had been conducted without a search warrant, 
and Kyllo claimed that it violated his Fourth Amendment rights.121 The lower 
courts denied Kyllo’s claim, holding that Kyllo had not tried to conceal the 
heat escaping from the home, showing that he did not expect that the 
information would be secret, and, in any event, “there was no objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy because the [scanner] ‘did not expose any 
intimate details of Kyllo’s life,’ only ‘amorphous “hot spots” on the roof and 
exterior wall.’”122 The Supreme Court, however, held for Kyllo. The Court 
recalled that “well into the 20th century, our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass” and stated that even though 
Fourth Amendment rights had been “decoupled . . . from trespassory 
violation of . . . property,”123 many basic property-related conceptions 
remained within the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. For instance, while 
the Fourth Amendment gave no protection to items within the home that were 
in “plain view” of the public streets, constitutional protection was still 
heightened for the “area immediately adjacent to a private home” and for areas 
within the home that are “covered.”124 On that basis, the Court ruled that even 
though the thermal information could be obtained without physically entering 
the home, it was constitutionally protected, as it emanated from the covered 
areas of the home. In some cases, the area creates the expectation of privacy; 
the Court noted, “[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, 
because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”125 
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The 2012 case of United States v. Jones126 has thrown into stark relief the 
tension between the Court’s property- and privacy-oriented jurisprudence. 
Jones involved the use of the data of a GPS device in a car. Police investigators 
received a warrant to attach a GPS tracking device to the underside of the 
defendant’s car in Washington, D.C. within ten days, but they attached the 
device on the eleventh day, in Maryland.127 The defendant sought to exclude 
information obtained by the device because GPS data was the product of a 
constitutional “search” and that failing to comply with the terms of the 
warrant rendered the search illegal.128 The government contended that the 
defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the location of his 
vehicle, and that, consequently, there was no constitutional “search.”129 The 
district court accepted the government’s contention in part, holding that 
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy while the defendant drove on 
the public streets; the ruling yielded sufficient evidence to convict the 
defendant of drug trafficking.130 A reversal by the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals led the Supreme Court to re-evaluate the scope of the Katz ruling. 
In Jones, the Supreme Court not only ruled for the defendant; it reasserted 
the importance of the asset-based approach to the Fourth Amendment. Noting 
that the government “physically occupied private property for the purpose of 
obtaining information,”131 the Court ruled that the government necessarily 
conducted a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because 
it intruded upon defendant’s property in a manner that would be considered 
trespass.132 Rejecting the argument that the Fourth Amendment protects 
“people not places,” the Court stated that defendant’s “Fourth Amendment 
rights do not rise or fall with the Katz formulation.”133 Painfully distinguishing 
a plethora of cases that seemed to indicate otherwise, the Court insisted that 
a trespassory search is always a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, and Katz should not be read to “repudiate that understanding.”134 
Rather, the Court ruled that “the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test 
has been added to, not substituted for, the common law trespassory test.”135 
After Jones, Fourth Amendment law remains in flux. Katz and its progeny 
have brought into the constitutional law of search and seizure a concern with 
privacy expectations completely detached from the traditional thing-oriented 
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understanding of the law. At the same time, Jones affirmed the vitality of the 
traditional thing-centered rules of constitutional search and seizure law. The 
Supreme Court’s most recent foray into search and seizure law, Carpenter v. 
United States, failed to dispel the confusion.136 Holding that a valid warrant 
was necessary to collect cell-site location information stored on cell phones 
of robbery suspects, the Court purported to be following Jones, even as its 
reasoning was far closer to the Katz line of cases. The balance between the 
competing approaches is yet to be decided. 
B. Criticisms of Current Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence 
The privacy-based jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment has been 
strongly criticized. The harshest critics argue that the “reasonable expectations of 
privacy” test does not and cannot dictate results, and it is logically incoherent. As 
Matthew Kugler and Lior Strahilevitz recently wrote, naming four Supreme 
Court justices, three other judges, and nine legal academics, there is widespread 
agreement that “there is a degree of circularity in the Katz ‘reasonable 
expectations of privacy’ test.”137 According to critics, the Court’s post-Katz Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence requires courts to extend the Fourth Amendment’s 
protection to any objects within the scope of the public’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy for the object, but the public’s reasonable expectation of privacy for 
the object is largely determined by the court’s decisions about whether legal 
protection extends to the object. As Judge Posner wrote, “it is circular to say that 
there is no invasion of privacy unless the individual whose privacy is invaded had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy; whether he will or will not have such an 
expectation will depend on what the legal rule is.”138 The result is an inquiry in 
which the premise depends on the outcome. 
A softer version of this criticism views the reasonable expectation of 
privacy test as excessively malleable. Many have criticized current doctrine as 
insufficiently protective of suspects’ rights,139 and argued that the fault lies in 
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a test capable of “taking on many alternative meanings” and therefore “open 
to ready manipulation.”140 
The mildest version of the criticism simply sees the test as “unstable.”141 
As Daniel Solove wrote, 
Few commentators are particularly fond of Fourth Amendment law. U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions applying the reasonable expectation of privacy test have been 
attacked as “unstable” and “illogical,” and even as engendering “pandemonium.” 
As one commentator has aptly observed, “[M]ost commentators have recognized 
that regardless of the political palatability of recent decisions, [F]ourth 
[A]mendment doctrine is in a state of theoretical chaos . . . .”142 
To be sure, the Court’s jurisprudence has its defenders. Several scholars 
praise the decision in Katz, even while opposing other aspects of the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.143 And while criticism of the alleged 
circularity of the “reasonable expectations of privacy” test is widely shared, 
there are grounds for defending the court against the charge. In a recent work, 
Matthew Kugler and Lior Strahilevitz examined how much the Court’s 
privacy-expectations test is circular by surveying the public for its expectations 
of privacy in cell-phone data both before and after the Supreme Court ruling 
in Riley v. California.144 Recall that Riley involved the seizure of a telephone 
incidental to an arrest. The question raised by the case was whether the police, 
who lawfully seized the phone itself, had the right to extract the data from the 
phone by operating it. The Court ultimately decided that the data was 
protected and could not be taken without a warrant.145 As Kugler and 
Strahilevitz noted, the outcome of Riley was not predicted, and it represented 
“an unambiguous change in law.”146 This meant that if the public’s expectations 
of privacy were developed based on Supreme Court rulings, the ruling in Riley 
should have caused a measurable change in public opinion: the decision should 
have resulted in an increased expectation of privacy in cell phone data. But the 
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Kugler–Strahilevitz study showed that the public expectations were not 
greatly altered by the Court’s decision.147 In the immediate aftermath of the 
decision, there was an immediate spike in the percentage of the population 
that believed that a warrant is necessary to access cell phone data. Yet the 
public quickly returned to its previous beliefs; any effect the decision may have 
had dissipated within weeks and months, and by the time two years had 
elapsed from the decisions, no change in public attitudes was discernable. 
Our aim in this Article is not to resolve the problems of Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. Rather, we view the difficulty of developing a coherent model 
for protecting privacy interests in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as an 
important cautionary tale for our effort to expand the profile of privacy 
interests in property law. While privacy interests lie at the core of search and 
seizure law, courts and theorists have struggled to develop a definition of 
privacy expectations that can successfully anchor Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
Stated otherwise, even as the Court has argued that privacy interests should 
not be restricted to traditional property rights of exclusion, the Court has failed 
to develop a model of protecting those interests that can stand completely 
independently of traditional understandings of property. 
Some have argued that flaws of current Fourth Amendment law can be 
found by returning privacy to its property roots.148 They argue that so long 
as property rights are understood sufficiently broadly, privacy interests can 
be fully protected from intrusive searches and seizures by protecting suspects’ 
traditional property interests. This Article’s agenda, in many ways, is the 
opposite. We do not seek to shape the law of privacy by returning it to its 
property roots. Rather, we seek to return property law to its traditional 
solicitousness for privacy interests. We do not claim that property concepts 
can resolve all the dilemmas of privacy law. We do, however, claim that 
property law is well suited to protect many privacy interests. 
III. PRIVACY INTERESTS IN PROPERTY LAW 
To this point, we have examined the effect of privacy on property law only 
peripherally. In this Part, we show that even after the emergence of privacy 
law as a distinct body (or bodies) of law, privacy concerns have continued to 
play a central role in several areas of property law. To be sure, the doctrines 
we discuss here are not unified—mostly, they represent the ad hoc use of 
privacy concerns to modify or interpret existing property law. There are, 
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however, a few cases where privacy concerns have been referenced more 
explicitly, and even viewed as an independent source of legal property rights. 
We begin with instances in statutory and common law of property that have 
struggled with the place of privacy in property law. We conclude this Part with 
a pair of Supreme Court cases that sought to define the limits that constitutional 
rights to privacy place on regulations of private residential property. 
A. Property Rights, Civil Rights, and Public Accommodations 
One of the most important developments in property in the last century 
was the development of a body of civil rights laws. The relevant civil rights 
laws curb property rightholders’ traditional rights by denying or limiting the 
rightholders’ ability to exercise those traditional rights when in service of 
specified kinds of invidious discrimination. 
Civil rights laws for property did not come completely out of the blue. 
One of the most important antecedents that ultimately contributed to the 
development of modern civil rights law was the common law of public 
accommodation.149 While the common law ordinarily placed few limits on the 
owners’ ability to exclude others for any reason, the public accommodation 
doctrine stated that common carriers and innkeepers could not deny service 
arbitrarily. And they could not charge unreasonable prices for their 
services.150 The early roots of the public accommodation doctrine were, 
therefore, quite modest.151 But even the modest doctrine distinguished 
between the private realm and open-market activity. It was only where 
rightholders had voluntarily made their property the arena for extremely 
public activity that their traditional exclusionary rights were curbed. While 
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privacy interests were never explicitly identified as the source of the 
distinction between properties subject to the public accommodation and 
those that were not, one can easily identify the way the doctrine offered 
greater protection for owners where privacy interests are likely to be greater. 
Modern civil rights law is more ambitious. But we would argue that it has 
followed a similar pattern of greater solicitousness to owners where privacy 
interests are likely to be stronger.152 
The first federal civil rights legislation was adopted in the wake of the 
Civil War, but the acts of the 1960s proved a watershed. The Civil Rights Act 
of 1866 remains in force,153 but the most significant of the civil rights acts 
through the prism of property was doubtless the federal Fair Housing Act 
(Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968).154 The Fair Housing Act restricts 
the rights of property rightholders to withhold consent to a sale or rental,155 
publish notices indicating a discriminatory preference for a sale or rental,156 
and discriminate in conditions of sale or rental.157 But the Fair Housing Act 
is not alone. Other federal civil rights acts also impact property rights.158 
Many state and municipal civil rights acts cover similar territory.159 
The stormy debate that surrounded passage of the federal Civil Rights Act of 
1968 has largely receded from memory. It concerned not only issues of race, but 
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also professed concerns for property rights.160 Although the civil rights acts 
limited the traditional prerogatives of property rightholders, it is also clear that 
the drafters of the various civil rights acts did not intend to sweep away concern 
for property rights. The Fair Housing Act balanced prerogatives of property 
owners with the interests of combating discrimination by creating exceptions to 
and limitations on the broad prohibitions on discrimination. And while the word 
privacy is not explicitly invoked by the Act, it is difficult to avoid the impression 
that it is solicitousness for the privacy interests of property rightholders affected 
by the Fair Housing Act that animates the type and nature of the Act’s exclusions. 
To see this, it is important as a preliminary matter to understand the 
mechanics of the Fair Housing Act. On its face, the legislation is extremely 
broad. The Act works by laying out several forbidden classes of discrimination 
(discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, familial status, national 
origin, and sometimes handicap), and by then forbidding discrimination based 
on those classifications, if the discrimination takes place within a specified list 
of acts (such as selling a dwelling or advertising its availability for rental). 
But the Act adds a few exceptions to its coverage. The most famous of 
these may be the so-called “Mrs. Murphy exemption,” which exempts from 
the Act’s coverage dwellings with living quarters for four or fewer families, 
so long as the owner lives in at least one of those living quarters.161 The Act 
includes a similar exception for owners of certain single-family homes; unlike 
the Mrs. Murphy exemption, the 296-word exception in § 3603(b)(1) lacks a 
colorful nickname and is far more qualified. Nothing in these two exceptions 
explicitly references privacy concerns, but their goal was to carve out a small 
class of cases in which owners’ property rights would prevail over the interest 
in preventing discrimination, because of the primacy of the rightholders’ 
privacy interests. As Senator Walter Mondale (one of the sponsors of the Fair 
Housing Act) stated, the intent of the Mrs. Murphy exemption was “to 
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exempt those who, by the direct personal nature of their activities, have a 
close personal relationship with their tenants.”162 
The exceptions in the Act obviously do not exhaust every potential situation in 
which property rightholders might claim a privacy interest. This has led to repeated 
litigation about the application of the Act (and equivalent state antidiscrimination 
laws) to situations in which the complainant sought to become a roommate. 
Decisions have not been uniform. Sometimes courts have stuck to the language of 
the statute and held property rightholders to the duty of nondiscrimination; other 
courts have upheld the primacy of the property rightholders’ privacy interest. 
Compare, for instance, the 2001 decision of the District Court of 
Massachusetts in Marya v. Slakey163 with the 2008 decision of the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommate.com, LLC.164 Marya v. Slakey involved a complainant (Kriti Arora) 
who sought to rent a room in a six-bedroom house owned by Linda Slakey.165 
Slakey did not make decisions on the rentals; she rented each bedroom 
separately to six tenants, but she permitted the tenants to choose replacements 
as a vacancy opened up in any of the bedrooms.166 Prospective tenants were 
expected to be vegetarian nonsmoking students at the University of 
Massachusetts; however, prospective tenants could only be accepted with the 
unanimous approval of existing tenants.167 When Arora applied for one 
vacancy, she was rejected by two of the existing tenants. One (Suzanne 
Castello) explained her rejection as owing to a “personality conflict,” while the 
other (Paul Norris) attributed his decision to Arora’s Indian ethnicity.168 
Norris stated that he did not want a third Indian roommate in addition to the 
two Indians already living on the premises because he did not want “a 
preponderance of one culture” in the house.169 Among Slakey’s defenses were 
two that implicitly sounded in privacy interests: first, Slakey claimed that 
Norris was not engaged “in the business” of renting dwelling space (meaning 
he was acting in a private rather than commercial capacity), and second, Slakey 
claimed she was entitled to the benefit of the Mrs. Murphy exemption.170 The 
court made short work of both defenses. It observed that there was no language 
in the Fair Housing Act that restricted its antidiscrimination provisions to 
professional agents or landlords.171 The court also noted that Slakey did not 
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occupy the premises and therefore did not fall within the literal language of 
the Mrs. Murphy exemption.172 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took a very different tack in Fair 
Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC.173 That case 
involved a challenge to the online service Roommate.com.174 Roommate.com 
is a website that matches up potential roommates with landlords and rooms. 
To match them up, Roommate.com requires users to answer many questions to 
establish a “profile”; among the questions are requests that users disclose sex, 
family status, and sexual orientation.175 The Fair Housing Council of San 
Fernando Valley sued under both the Fair Housing Act and the equivalent 
California legislation.176 The Council claimed that Roommate.com was acting 
as a broker and asking questions that a broker would surely be barred from 
asking to steer prospective roommates in a manner that is discriminatory 
under the law.177 Acknowledging that “it’s quite clear that what Roommate 
does amounts to a violation” of the Fair Housing Act “[i]f the [Act] extends 
to shared living situations,” the court still ruled for Roommate.com because 
the Act does not apply to roommates.178 None of the privacy exceptions 
within the statute directly applied to the case—not only because the 
complaint covered a general practice that applied to numerous individual 
homes, but also because the Fair Housing Act exceptions do not exempt 
advertising and the publication of notices. The court therefore essentially 
fashioned a new exception for rentals to roommates, by reinterpreting the 
term “dwelling.” The court determined that in reference to “dwellings,” the 
statute intended to apply only to “living unit[s] designed or intended for 
occupancy by a family,” meaning that the Act applies only to “an independent 
living unit . . . stop[ping] the [Act] at the front door.”179 
In so ruling, the court placed great emphasis on the privacy interests of 
the property rightholders. The court wrote: “Aside from immediate family or 
a romantic partner, it’s hard to imagine a relationship more intimate than that 
between roommates, who share living rooms, dining rooms, kitchens, 
bathrooms, even bedrooms. Because of a roommate’s unfettered access to the 
home, choosing a roommate implicates significant privacy and safety 
considerations.”180 “The home,” the Court noted, “is the center of our private 
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lives. . . . Holding that the [Fair Housing Act] applies inside a home or 
apartment would allow the government to restrict our ability to choose 
roommates compatible with our lifestyles. This would be a serious invasion 
of privacy, autonomy and security.”181 
As the Roommate.com ruling highlights, antidiscrimination rules for 
property are sensitive to the privacy interests of property rightholders. While 
courts (and legislatures) differ about the precise point where privacy interests 
should prevail over the societal interest in preventing discrimination, there is 
little doubt that privacy interests are important enough to protect property 
rightholders on at least some occasions, despite the very clear societal interest 
in preventing invidious discrimination. 
B. Investigative Reporting and Trespass 
Privacy interests are not generally thought to be part of the law of trespass. 
On paper, trespass is a strict-liability tort. According to the Restatement, any 
intentional unlicensed entry onto land (in person or with an object) is a 
trespass, despite whether it causes harm to the legal possessor of the land.182 
Put differently, “[a]ny intentional intrusion that deprives another of 
possession of land, even if only temporarily, is considered a trespass.”183 
Despite the surface simplicity, there are instances where trespass cases involve 
a deeper analysis of the interests. For instance, sometimes, a person enters on the 
land of another with permission, but the permission was obtained by deception 
or fraud. Courts have divided on the question of whether and when such 
deceptions nullify the license to enter and turn the visitor into a trespasser.184 
For our purposes, the most interesting of the trespass by decision cases is 
Desnick v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.185 ABC reporters sought access 
to an eye clinic to report on deceptive and fraudulent practices by doctors in 
the clinic. To get the full information, ABC itself engaged in some deception. 
A producer for the ABC program PrimeTime Live told Dr. James Desnick (the 
owner of the clinic) that the program wanted to film the work of the Desnick 
Eye Center and interview doctors, technicians, and patients as part of a story 
on large cataract practices. The producer reassured Desnick that the segment 
“would not involve ‘ambush’ interviews or ‘undercover’ surveillance, and that it 
 
181 Id. 
182 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (AM. LAW. INST. 1965). 
183 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 149, at 7. 
184 See LL NJ, Inc. v. NBC-Subsidiary (WCAU-TV), L.P., No. 06-14312, 2008 WL 1923261, at 
*16 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 28, 2008) (“[T]here is no clear majority rule on the subject of fraud vitiating 
consent to entry upon land.”). 
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would be ‘fair and balanced.’”186 But the producer concealed from Desnick that 
ABC also sent seven people with concealed cameras to the Desnick Eye Center 
to pose as patients and surreptitiously film the clinic’s practices.187 The segment 
that was ultimately aired used the film gathered by the fake patients in a 
segment that ABC called an “undercover investigation” that revealed 
“evidence” that Desnick performed “unnecessary cataract surgery for the 
money.”188 Desnick sued on several grounds including trespass.189 
Seeking to cut through the confusing case law on fraudulently obtained 
licenses to enter, Judge Posner, writing for the court, stated that the different 
results cannot be explained based on the nature of the fraud. Rather, he said, the 
case law must be explained by the interests protected by the law. Where the 
plaintiff truly sought to prevent an “invasion”—for instance, where a 
“homeowner [is] victimized by the phony meter reader”—the trespass claim 
should be upheld because the homeowner “does not want strangers in his house 
unless they have authorized service functions.”190 By contrast, wrote Posner, here, 
Desnick did not object to the presence of patients in the office: “The test patients 
entered offices that were open to anyone expressing a desire for ophthalmic 
services and videotaped physicians engaged in professional, not personal, 
communications with strangers (the testers themselves). The activities of the 
offices were not disrupted . . . .”191 Posner continued, “nor was there any 
‘inva[sion of] a person’s private space,’ as in our hypothetical meter-reader 
case . . . . No embarrassingly intimate details of anybody’s life were publicized in 
the present case. There was no eavesdropping on a private conversation . . . .”192 
“Had the testers been undercover FBI agents,” noted Posner, “there would have 
been no violation of the Fourth Amendment, because there would have been no 
invasion of a legally protected interest in property or privacy.”193 
Surprisingly, Posner did not explicitly acknowledge the relevant property 
interest protected by this class of trespass cases as privacy. Instead, he 
described the relevant interests as “ownership or possession of land,”194 which 
is a description that could describe all trespass cases. Still, it is difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that Judge Posner sought to limit liability for trespass 
cases premised on a fraudulently obtained license to enter only to those cases 
where a privacy interest is compromised. 
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Judge Posner’s approach is not universally accepted, but it has proved 
influential. Three years after Desnick, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals 
faced a similar set of claims against ABC and PrimeTime Live for trespass 
based on deception in an investigative report. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital 
Cities/ABC, Inc. involved two ABC television reporters who had used fake 
resumes to get employment at the supermarket Food Lion, to surreptitiously 
videotape “what appeared to be unwholesome food handling practices.” 195 
Citing Desnick, the court this time found for the plaintiff.196 The court 
acknowledged that the reporters here, like the “test patients” in Desnick, had 
gained entry by a misrepresentation that did not appear to invade any 
significant protected property interest.197 Yet the court reasoned that the ABC 
reporters in the Food Lion case did not simply enter the property but had 
entered “nonpublic areas of the store[.]”198 According to the court, this was 
more analogous to using misrepresentation to place a video camera in the 
ceiling of an estranged spouse’s bedroom.199 The court therefore found the jury 
finding of trespass legally justified.200 As in Desnick, the court did not explicitly 
invoke “privacy” as the name of the property interest being vindicated. 
To be sure, the cases of trespass based on misrepresentation are not 
uniform in focusing on privacy. But there is an identifiable theme in some of 
the case law of assessing the strength of a trespass case based on whether the 
property rightholders’ privacy interests were violated. 
C. Beach Access, Public Easements and Privacy Interests 
Another interesting area in which the privacy interests of property 
rightholders have muscled their way into the law is the field of beach access 
law. Beach-access rules are difficult to summarize. The problem addressed by 
beach-access law is this: often, beach areas are public, or at least open to the 
public, but the best routes to the public beaches cross through private land. 
In several states, courts have created doctrines for subjecting the private lands 
to public easements to allow the public access to the public beaches.201 
 
195 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999). 
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201 See generally 4 JAMES H. BACKMAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY ¶ 34.11 (Matthew Bender 
ed., 1997). In California, the judicial creation of a doctrine of public access in Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 
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§ 1009 (West 1971), enacted shortly after the Gion decision, limited the creation of implied public easements 
to cases of express written offers. Still, until recently, courts resisted the legislature’s instruction to 
strengthen private property rights in this context. See, e.g., Scher v. Burke, 395 P.2d 680 (Cal. 2017). 
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The most famous of these is the judgment of the New Jersey Supreme 
Court in Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Association.202 In Matthews, the 
Court considered claims for access to seventy-six beachfront properties in the 
coastal town of Bay Head.203 Of the seventy-six properties, six were owned 
by the Bay Head Improvement Association, and most of the other seventy 
were owned by Association members who had granted the Association the 
right to regulate access.204 Under extant New Jersey law at the time, all 
beachfront property below the mean high-tide line was owned by the state 
under the “public trust doctrine,” which held that title to certain properties 
were held by the state for the benefit and use of the public.205 The plaintiffs 
in Matthews claimed that because the beachfront was supposed to be available 
to the public, the public was entitled to cross through private lands to gain 
access to the public beaches.206 The Court agreed, arguing that public rights 
to the beachfront would be “meaningless” absent the ability to access the 
beach, and that the “public trust doctrine” therefore necessarily implied the 
existence of a public easement over private lands to access the public beach.207 
The New Jersey version of the public trust doctrine therefore subjects coastal 
private lands to a public easement that allows members of the public to walk 
to the beach through the private property without permission. 
Yet New Jersey law has placed some limits on the judicially created public 
easements. The Matthews court identified four factors to be considered 
before creating and “fixing the contours” of the public easements: “[1] 
[l]ocation of the dry sand area in relation to the foreshore, [2] extent and 
availability of publicly-owned upland sand area, [3] nature and extent of the 
public demand, and [4] usage of the upland sand land by the owner.”208 Little 
case law explicates the nature of the usages that warrant upholding property 
rights against the potential claims of a public easement. But privacy plays a 
role in the issue; the fourth factor indirectly protects the privacy interests of 
beachfront property owners. Obviously, a public easement that might have 
members of the public wandering past homeowners’ bedroom windows 
would have a weaker claim than one that would merely have them crossing 
through an empty field. 
In Part IV, we will return to the issue of beach access and propose a better 
and more direct way to take account of the privacy interests of homeowners 
whose lots adjoin the shore. 
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D.  Land Use Regulation and Private Residential Property 
Another striking example of the importance of privacy interests in 
property law can be seen in the regulation of land use. Several cases about the 
use of land have explicitly invoked privacy interests. While some of the cases 
involve privacy rights that the courts found outside the ambit of property law 
(and, instead, located in specific constitutional protections for privacy), 
nonetheless, it is also possible to see in the land use cases an understanding 
that property rights themselves entail a privacy interest. 
The question of privacy rights of residential property rightholders arose 
at the national level in a pair of celebrated Supreme Court cases in the mid-
1970s. In 1974,209 and then again in 1977,210 the Supreme Court dealt with 
constitutional challenges to local zoning ordinances that placed limitations on 
the rights of property rightholders to decide who would live in their private 
residences. In each case, the property rightholders challenged the ordinances 
on several constitutional grounds, including a claimed infringement upon the 
owners’ rights to privacy. In one case, the Supreme Court sided with the state, 
and in the other case it did not. Today, the constitutional privacy doctrine for 
residential property lies somewhere between the pair of rulings. 
The 1974 case, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,211 involved a zoning ordinance 
that permitted only one-family dwellings within the village of Belle Terre, and 
defined a “family” as meaning, “[o]ne or more persons related by blood, 
adoption, or marriage, living and cooking together as a single housekeeping 
unit, exclusive of household servants.”212 The ordinance added that “[a] 
number of persons but not exceeding two (2) living and cooking together as a 
single housekeeping unit through [sic] not related by blood, adoption, or 
marriage shall be deemed to constitute a family.”213 The ordinance thus forbade 
unrelated roommates from living together in the village of Belle Terre, in any 
number of three or more persons.214 The challengers to the village’s ordinance 
were six students at S.U.N.Y. Stony Brook who were living together in a single 
rented house and the owner who had rented the house to them.215 The 
challengers claimed that the ordinance unconstitutionally discriminated 
against unmarried persons living together and that it suffered from many other 
constitutional infirmities including that “the restriction of those whom the 
neighbors do not like trenches on the newcomers’ rights of privacy.”216 The 
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Court dismissed all the challenges.217 While labelling the “rights of privacy” a 
fundamental constitutional right, the Court found no reason to believe that 
the land use restriction affected the right in any way.218 Instead, the Court 
viewed the ordinance as an example of economic and social legislation where 
courts should be reluctant to second-guess legislative line-drawing.219 
Three years later, the Court examined a similar ordinance but reached a 
different conclusion. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland,220 the Court 
considered a zoning ordinance that permitted only one family to live within 
dwellings in the city.221 Here, however, the definition of family was longer 
and more restrictive than Belle Terre’s. Essentially, the ordinance defined 
family as including only a person and his or her spouse, their unmarried 
children, and their parents.222 And grandchildren and children-in-law could 
be included in the family, so long as they all belonged to one, and only one, 
dependent child.223 Inez Moore, who challenged the ordinance, lived together 
with her son Dale Sr. and two grandchildren, but fell afoul of the law because 
the two grandchildren were not offspring of the same child.224 One 
grandchild, Dale Jr., was the offspring of Dale Sr., and therefore considered a 
member of the family according to the city of East Cleveland.225 But the other 
grandchild, John Jr., was a nephew of Dale Sr., and cousin of Dale Jr., and 
therefore not a member of the “family” according to the law.226 
This time the Court invalidated the zoning ordinance. A plurality concluded 
that the ordinance “slic[ed] deeply into the family itself.”227 Stating that there is a 
“private realm of family life [into] which the state cannot enter,”228 the Court’s 
plurality held that while zoning ordinances could legitimately regulate the family, 
“when the government intrudes on choices concerning family living 
arrangements, this Court must examine carefully the importance of the 
governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are served by the 
challenged regulation” and “[w]hen thus examined, this ordinance cannot 
survive.”229 Acknowledging the validity of state interests in preventing 
overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an undue 
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financial burden on East Cleveland’s school system, the plurality nonetheless 
found the ordinance to have “but a tenuous relation” to resolving such problems.230 
Notably, in neither case did the Supreme Court purport to interpret the scope 
of the property rights at issue. Indeed, of the five justices who voted to strike 
down the offending ordinance in Moore and attributed their ruling to the 
constitutional guarantee of “substantive” due process, only one—Justice Stevens 
in a concurring opinion—explicitly labeled the protected interest as property. 231 
Still, the importance of privacy in property and land use regulation is evident. 
IV. INCORPORATING PRIVACY IN PROPERTY LAW 
In this Part, we present our normative thesis. First, we show how property 
doctrine should change to take greater account of privacy interests; in the 
next Section, we look at how privacy concerns should change our 
understanding of property theory. 
A. Toward a New Understanding of Property Law 
Doctrinally, we argue that property law should take account of privacy 
interests and, moreover, should be tailored to respect them. As we have 
shown,232 some key aspects of extant property doctrine—in particular, owners’ 
right to exclude—already embody privacy concerns. We propose adopting more 
broadly the rule that the protection of property rights should be calibrated to 
the strength of privacy expectations of the owner wherever possible. In saying 
this, we do not mean to say that where privacy expectations are low or 
nonexistent, property protection should disappear. Rather, we argue for 
adjusting property doctrine in two ways. First, the degree of relief offered to 
aggrieved property rights owners should vary with the degree of impact on 
privacy. Second, in some cases, the scope of rights that attend property 
ownership should vary based upon privacy expectations. We now turn to several 
specific contexts in which property doctrine can be adjusted. 
Our doctrinal proposals are intended to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. 
Privacy concerns can be incorporated in almost every area of property law. 
1. Trespass 
The law of trespass is not as clear cut as it may initially appear. Not every 
unauthorized entry of another’s property is actionable. As we showed in the 
previous Part, courts have sanctioned physical entry into other persons’ property 
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when permission to enter was gained by fraud.233 And courts have authorized 
certain unauthorized entries into others’ airspace.234 At the same time, courts 
have failed to develop a coherent theory that explains when physical invasions 
of another’s space are actionable and when they are not. We posit that protection 
of privacy interests can serve as a unifying principle of trespass cases, and, thus, 
be serviceable to courts and private actors alike. Explicit recognition of the fact 
that privacy is one of the property interests protected by trespass can help clear 
up many of the doctrinal difficulties of trespass. 
To illustrate this, consider again the case of trespass predicated on a 
theory of misrepresentation or fraudulently obtained license. As we noted, 
one line of case law can be interpreted as distinguishing actionable trespass 
based on privacy interests.235 Specifically, we observed that Judge Posner’s 
ruling in Desnick seems implicitly to identify the privacy interest as one of 
the property rights sought to be upheld by the tort of trespass, and to rule 
that where someone enters property because of misrepresentation, that entry 
should only be considered trespassory if the entry results in harm to the 
privacy interest. We argue that Posner’s implicit argument should be made 
explicit and expanded. One component of the value that landowners (and 
other property rightholders with rights of possession) realize from possession 
is the ability to protect their privacy. Openly recognizing this with trespass 
makes it possible to identify actionable instances of the tort in several cases. 
One case where the privacy interest can help has already been noted: it can 
distinguish between cases where a misrepresentation nullifies a license and 
turns an entry into trespass and those where the misrepresentation cannot 
nullify the license. A second case where privacy interests can help involves 
aerial or subterranean entry to land. While trespass nominally occurs whenever 
there is purposeful unlicensed entry on to land, no matter how trivial, in 
practice, many courts have refused to uphold trespass claims premised on entry 
the court considered not to interfere with protected property interests. For 
instance, in Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, the court denied liability for 
trespass by two airline companies—United and Pacific—for repeatedly flying 
airplanes over the plaintiff ’s land at distances as low as 150 feet above ground.236 
The court acknowledged that the traditional doctrine of cujus est solum ejus est 
 
233 See supra Part III. 
234 For instance, in Hinman v. Pacific Air Transportation, 84 F.2d 755, 758 (9th Cir. 1936), the 
court explained, 
It would be, and is, utterly impracticable and would lead to endless confusion, if the law 
should uphold attempts of landowners to stake out, or assert claims to definite, unused 
spaces in the air in order to protect some contemplated future use of it. . . . We will not 
foist any such chimerical concept of property rights upon the jurisprudence of this country. 
235 See supra Part III.B. 
236 84 F.2d 755, 758-59 (9th Cir. 1936). 
 
2019] The Privacy Interest in Property 907 
usque ad coelum237 (generally called the ad coelum doctrine) granted owners of 
land ownership not only of surface areas, but of the adjacent subterranean areas 
down to the center of the earth, and of adjacent airspace extending into the 
heavens.238 If interpreted literally this doctrine would have rendered all flights 
over private land, before the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,239 trespass unless the 
airline got licenses from each and every overflown plot of land.240 The Hinman 
court—like others faced with claims of trespass by overflight—brushed aside 
the trespass claim in uncompromising terms. The court ruled that the ad coelum 
doctrine “is not the law, and . . . never was the law.”241 It then proceeded to 
acknowledge the validity of owners’ claims to aerial rights, stating that the true 
law was that “the owner of the land could use the overlying space to such an 
extent as he was able, and that no one could ever interfere with that use.”242 
Similarly extreme language appeared in United States v. Causby,243 where the 
Supreme Court stated that the ad coelum doctrine “has no place in the modern 
world,” before ruling that the owner of land owns only “the immediate reaches 
of the enveloping atmosphere.”244 But the Court found a taking of property 
when airplanes flew 83 feet off the ground; this distance apparently fell within 
the boundaries of the “immediate reaches.”245 
These cases may have important, yet unappreciated, implications now 
because of the growing use of drones. The case law reveals no clear answer to 
the question of when an aerial intrusion constitutes a trespass. Causby suggests 
the answer is to be found in measure of distance of eighty-three feet or more 
from the ground; Hinman suggests a different answer—the ownership of land 
extends only to the aerial distance of the owner’s actual uses. How should 
courts react when landowners raise claims of trespass by overflight of drones? 
One possible answer lies in examination of the privacy interests. Rather than 
 
237 The literal translation is “whoever owns the soil owns also to the sky and to the depths.” 
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 149, at 10 n.*. 
238 Hinman, 84 F.2d at 757. 
239 Id. 
240 See William F. Baxter & Lillian R. Altree, Legal Aspects of Airport Noise, J.L. & ECON. 1, 31 
(1972) (“[W]e must dismiss [trespass] as a tool incapable of inducing efficient allocation of 
resources.”); Colin Cahoon, Comment, Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land, 56 J. 
AIR L. & COM. 157, 191-92 (1990) (describing different ways to evaluate ownership of airspace above 
five hundred feet); Troy A. Rule, Airspace in an Age of Drones, 95 B.U. L. REV. 155, 165-70 (2015) 
(discussing the ad coelom doctrine in the context of United States v. Causby); see also Airplane Noise, 
Property Rights, and the Constitution, supra note 26, at 1431 (“[F]or the landowner to have full 
enjoyment of his property ‘he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the 
enveloping atmosphere”; invasions of that airspace ‘are in the same category as invasions of the 
surface.’” (quoting United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264-65 (1946))). 
241 Hinman, 84 F.2d at 757. 
242 Id. 
243 328 U.S. 256 (1946). 
244 Id. at 261, 264. 
245 Id. at 266. 
 
908 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 869 
focus solely on use or non-use of airspace, or an eighty-three–foot 
measurement of the “immediate reaches,”246 courts can look to the nature of 
the property interest threatened by the invasion. Some modern drones have 
cameras and transmission capabilities, and are readily used for surveillance, 
posing a significant threat to the privacy of overflown properties. A trespass 
claim ought to be viable even where the owner cannot show a use of the 
airspace, when the overflight threatens the privacy of the landowner. 
2. Nuisance 
Another legal area that stands to benefit from our call to play up the weight 
given to privacy considerations is nuisance law. Nuisance is defined as 
unreasonable interference with another’s use and enjoyment of her land.247 
The critical determination courts ought to make in adjudicating nuisance 
claims is whether the alleged interference crosses the threshold of 
unreasonableness.248 Nuisance doctrine is notoriously vague. Several 
reasonableness standards compete for courts’ affiliation.249 Relatedly, nuisance 
doctrine is open-ended, inviting courts to consider a host of factors in deciding 
nuisance disputes.250 Given the centrality of privacy to owners’ enjoyment of 
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their property, there is no reason to exclude privacy harms from the calculus. 
On the contrary, courts should examine whether the alleged interference also 
compromised the victim’s privacy interest, and if the answer is yes, this factor 
should heavily support classifying the activity as a private nuisance. 
The nature of the cause of action we have in mind is illustrated in a legal 
dispute that arose between the Tate Modern gallery in London and nearby 
luxury flat dwellers.251 The dwellers claim that the public platform that is part 
of the gallery compromises their privacy by giving visitors direct view of their 
homes.252 According to the owners the “viewing platform is unreasonably 
interfering with the claimants’ enjoyment of their flats, so as to be a 
nuisance.”253 A former dweller, Yumi Kumazawa said she supports the lawsuit 
filed by the current dwellers because “their privacy should be respected.”254 It 
should be further added that the units facing the viewing platform have 
become less marketable because of privacy concerns.255 The case constitutes a 
vivid example of the possible use of nuisance law to protect privacy interests. 
While ordinarily nuisance law does not deal with visual interferences,256 
nothing in the doctrine prevents such suits and in appropriate cases it should 
be invoked to protect property owners’ privacy. 
3. Covenants and Other Servitudes 
A third area where privacy concerns can be profitably integrated into 
property doctrine is the law of servitudes. The law of servitudes covers a 
multitude of nonpossessory property interests, from promises that are 
enforceable based on one’s relationship with the burdened property 
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viewing-platform-prompts-writ-from-luxury-flat-dwellers [https://perma.cc/X62d-5C8Q]. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
254 Id. 
255 See id. (noting that one resident “looked at a couple of the flats on [the side facing Tate] 
but decided against them, mainly for reasons of privacy”). 
256 Robert D. Dodson, Rethinking Private Nuisance Law: Recognizing Aesthetic Nuisances in the 
New Millennium, 10 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 9 (2002) (“[C]ourts have denied aesthetic nuisance actions 
on the ground that visual interference does not constitute substantial interference.”). 
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(covenants and equitable servitudes) to such items as rights of way.257 Real 
covenants and equitable servitudes are particularly flexible, and potentially 
cover every kind of activity that “touches and concerns” land.258 The 
chronological reach of real covenants and equitable servitudes is indefinite; 
theoretically, covenants could persist in perpetuity, binding successors in 
interests separated by hundreds of years from the covenant’s creation.259 The 
vast scope of real covenants and equitable servitudes is restrained by a host 
of judicial doctrines that deny the enforceability or even terminate the 
servitudes in certain circumstances. For instance, courts will refuse to enforce 
servitudes that impose unreasonable restraints on alienation260 or violate 
public policy,261 and they may terminate servitudes when changed 
circumstances make further enforcement impracticable.262 
The increased popularity of common interest communities in recent 
decades263 has expanded awareness of servitudes. Common interest 
communities use covenants as a governance device to ensure that all unit owners 
abide by certain rules. Substantively, the covenants span a wide range of issues 
from assessment and collection of fees, through maintenance of common areas, 
to usage of units. Courts have generally shown a great deal of deference to 
covenants, especially those recorded in a community’s declaration.264 
 
257 Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 1261, 1262 (1982) (explaining that servitudes are “private arrangements . . . used extensively to 
secure a wide variety of economic, aesthetic, and personal advantages to the owners and occupiers of land”). 
258 See id. at 1263-64. 
259 Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value of Servitude Restrictions, 
70 IOWA L. REV. 615, 644 (1985) (“Freedom of contract can adversely affect third parties, and, 
because servitudes can be difficult to remove, freedom of contract may perpetuate restrictions that 
have lost their usefulness even to the parties who originally imposed them.”). 
260 See generally Luke Meier & Rory Ryan, Aggregate Alienability, 60 VILL. L. REV. 1013 (2015) 
(noting several cases where the courts either upheld or struck down restraints on alienation). 
261 See Andrew Russell, Comment, The Tenth Anniversary of the Restatement (Third) of Property, 
Servitudes: A Progress Report, 42 U. TOL. L. REV. 753, 761 (2011) (noting that “[u]nder section 3.1 [of The 
Third Restatement], a servitude is ‘valid unless it is illegal or unconstitutional or violates public policy’”). 
262 See Comment, Termination of Servitudes: Expanding the Remedies for Changed Circumstances, 
31 UCLA L. REV. 226, 227 (1983) (“Under the doctrine of changed conditions, courts will not enforce 
these restrictions when a change in surrounding conditions.”). 
263 Statistical Information, COMMUNITY ASS’NS INST., https://www.caionline.org/PressReleases/
pages/statisticalinformation.aspx [https://perma.cc/35KM-6ZP5]; see also Paula A. Franzese, 
Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest Communities and the Rise of Government for “the Nice”, 
37 URB. LAW. 335, 335 (2005) (“Common interest communities, once at the fringes of mainstream 
residential life, now represent the norm of housing development.”). 
264 See, e.g., Andrea J. Boyack, Common Interest Community Covenants and the Freedom of Contract 
Myth, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 767, 783 (2014) (noting that “provisions of the recorded declaration as of the 
date of an owner’s purchase are presumptively binding unless the provisions violate public policy”). 
For a passionate defense of this approach, see Richard A. Epstein, Notice and Freedom of Contract in 
the Law of Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1353, 1360-64 (1982). 
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Interestingly, despite the wide array of tools available to courts to terminate or 
refuse to enforce covenants,265 none specifically relates to privacy. We argue that 
this should change. Courts should incorporate privacy considerations in assessing 
the enforceability of covenants. Just as a covenant that unreasonably restrains 
alienation is set aside, so too should the courts refuse to enforce covenants that 
unreasonably infringe upon the privacy interests of burdened parties. 
4. Remedies 
Our final doctrinal suggestion concerns remedies for torts that sound in 
breaches of property rights, such as trespass. The remedies for such breaches 
are varied, and potentially drastic.266 We argue that taking explicit account of 
privacy interests should help modulate the remedies. We illustrate our 
suggestions for modifying remedies in three distinct contexts. 
a. Encroachments 
We begin by considering the legal regime pertaining to encroachments or 
permanent trespass—cases in which one trespasses by building a permanent 
structure on a neighbor’s lot.267 Under the common law, encroachments were 
met with an injunction. The encroached upon owner was entitled to injunctive 
relief even if the encroacher acted in good faith on the erroneous belief that she 
was improving her own lot.268 Nowadays, most states have statutorily softened 
up the common law rule by granting courts broad discretion in establishing 
remedies. Courts may award damages instead of injunctive relief to good-faith 
improvers, and they may even rearrange the property rights, such as by 
transferring title to the trespasser.269 For instance, instead of ordering the 
destruction of the encroaching structure, courts can order that it be transferred 
to the plaintiff together with the land on which it was erected, and force the 
 
265 See generally Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000). 
266 See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Reconceptualizing Trespass, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
1823, 1829 (2009) (pointing out that “the law offers a property owner an impressive array of powers 
and remedies, all designed to help her fend off unwanted entry onto her property”). 
267 See e.g., JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 40 (2d ed. 2005) 
(discussing encroachments). 
268 See e.g., James L. Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for 
Property and Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 134 (1993) (noting that under the traditional 
view of the common law, that of “the early nineteenth century . . . when an owner vindicated his 
title to the land by ejecting the improver from possession, his title was held to encompass title to 
the improvements”); Deepa Varadarajan, Improvement Doctrines, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 657, 669 
(2014) (“Under the conventional common law view, the mistaken improver of land was not entitled 
to any compensation from the landowner for the improvement.”). 
269 E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 871.1–871.7 (West 2009). 
 
912 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 167: 869 
plaintiff to compensate the defendant–encroacher.270 Alternatively, courts can 
leave the encroaching edifice in the hands of the possession of the defendant 
together with the land underlying, but have her pay an increased compensation 
amount to the plaintiff.271 The doctrines governing courts’ discretion in cases of 
good-faith encroachment are notably vague. California law, for instance, directs 
courts to adjust remedies for “substantial justice.”272 It would be a relatively 
straightforward matter to include privacy interests among the factors to be 
considered by a court in determining the remedy for encroachment. An 
encroachment that exposes areas of land where plaintiffs have privacy interests 
should naturally be treated more harshly than one where no such privacy 
interests are implicated. For example, an encroachment that brings on to the 
plaintiff ’s land a window from which the trespasser can peer into the plaintiff ’s 
back yard should clearly be treated more seriously than an encroachment of a 
stone wall on to empty land that is being held for speculative purposes. 
b. Punitive Damages 
Another instance in which trespass remedies could benefit from explicit 
consideration of privacy relates to punitive damages. As illustrated in the 
celebrated case of Jacque v. Steenberg Homes,273 even minor acts of trespass can 
support awards of substantial punitive damages. Jacque involved the 
unlicensed transport of a mobile home across a snowy field owned by the 
Jacques. The court found no damage suffered by the Jacques, but it still 
awarded the Jacques $100,000 in punitive damages, and the punitive damages 
award was upheld on appeal. The court justified the punitive damages award 
by looking at the egregiousness of the defendant’s decision to trespass.274 
Punitive damages are a controversial subject largely because they are difficult 
to pin down. By their nature, punitive damages awards cannot be 
straightforwardly calculated by standard damages formulae. In recent 
decades, the Supreme Court has placed proportionality limits on punitive 
damages,275 but there is, as yet, no clear judicial enunciation of the way the 
 
270 See Kelvin H. Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. REV. 37, 42 n.28 
(1985) (reporting that at least forty-two states have adopted versions of such acts). 
271 See Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793, 796 (1998) (discussing 
this possibility). 
272 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 871.3(b) (West 2000). 
273 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997). 
274 Id. at 160-61, 164. 
275 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279 (1989) (“[P]etitioners 
and their amici would like us to craft some common-law standard of excessiveness that relies on 
notions of proportionality between punitive and compensatory damages . . . . [W]e decline that 
invitation.”); see also Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker 554 U.S. 471, 503 (2008) (requiring that punitive 
damages bear a reasonable relationship to damages and ruling that in maritime cases a one to one 
ratio is a fair upper bound); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996) (“The principle 
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proportionality limits should be applied in trespass cases. The Jacque court 
itself struggled to find an adequate means for measuring the appropriate 
amount of punitive damages, and the basis for determining proportionality.276 
We submit that attention to the privacy interest in property can provide 
an important clarifying element in determining punitive damages awards. 
Specifically, how much privacy interests are compromised by a trespass, even 
if not directly compensable, should play a role in the decision to award 
punitive damages and the scope of such damages. 
c. Heads of Damage 
A final way in which explicit attention to privacy could improve remedies 
calculations is by direct inclusion of privacy as a head of damages. While 
attention to privacy damage is rare, it can be found occasionally in past cases. 
Consider City of Ocean City v. Maffucci.277 The State of New Jersey and the 
Army Corps of Engineers sought beachfront property to build new sand 
dunes, and they used eminent domain to seize from the Maffuccis and several 
others an easement over a fifty-by-eighty foot strip of beach in front of their 
property. The court determined that the dune obstructed views and reduced 
beach access, producing small but measurable market losses to the property 
owners.278 Importantly, in measuring damages, the court did not suffice with 
the value of the loss of view, reduced beach access, and the loss of use of the 
fifty-by-eighty foot strip. The court added an award of “loss of privacy,” 
holding that it was proper to consider the reduced privacy resulting from 
increased pedestrian traffic should be considered part of the property “taken” 
by the state.279 Other partial-takings cases have likewise viewed privacy as a 
portion of the property taken, and therefore viewed a loss of privacy as a 
separate head of damage that deserves compensation.280 
While in the context of eminent domain, courts have been most willing to 
recognize loss of privacy as a separate head of damage, there is no reason to 
restrict the head of damage to such cases. Trespass, nuisance, trespass to chattels, 
conversion, and, indeed many actions that result in compensable damage to 
 
that exemplary damages must bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages has a long 
pedigree.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
276 Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 164 (“We have expressly rejected the use of a fixed multiplier . . . to 
calculate the amount of reasonable punitive damages . . . . While a constitutional line ought not be 
marked by a simple mathematical formula, the proportionate rule for punitive damages is one factor 
in determining the reasonableness of the punitive damage award.”). 
277 740 A.2d 630 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
278 Id. at 640. 
279 Id. at 641. 
280 See, e.g., Pierpont Inn, Inc. v. State, 449 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1969); La Plata Elec. Assoc. v. 
Cummins, 728 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1986); State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Hesselden Inv. Co., 
504 P.2d 634 (N.M. 1972). 
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property interests potentially involve damage to privacy interests, and all could 
benefit from the recognition of privacy as a separate head of damage. 
The damages are not restricted to specific types of property or assets. 
Naturally, the degree of an owner’s privacy expectations varies greatly among 
assets. An owner may have a strong privacy expectation at her home and a weaker 
privacy expectation at work. She may have a stronger degree of privacy 
expectation for her personal papers than for the newspaper she just bought. 
Indeed, property rights in certain objects—for example, a pen—characteristically 
cause little or no expectation of privacy, while ownership of others—say a laptop 
computer—engenders privacy expectations. But this does not mean that privacy 
interests are only endangered by damage to certain kinds of assets but not others. 
A home is generally considered more sensitive from the viewpoint of privacy, but 
the scope of the protection granted to an owner and the remedies to which she is 
entitled should depend on the privacy harm resulting from the violation. For 
example, a trespass on another’s property consisting of an unauthorized U-turn 
near a driveway would be treated very differently from an act of trespass 
involving unauthorized passing by the owner’s bedroom window, as the latter 
would engender far more serious damage to privacy interests. 
Likewise, consider a case in which one person breaks into another’s car and 
uses it without her permission. Ordinarily one would expect conversion of a car 
not to entail great damage to privacy interests. If, however, the car owner kept 
private correspondence inside the car, she should be entitled to remedies that 
reflect not only for the harm suffered from the seizure of the car and the 
unauthorized use, but also for the damage arising from the intrusion of her privacy. 
There are certain assets whose unauthorized use would invariably involve an 
intrusion of the owner’s privacy expectations. This would hold true with 
smartphones, tablets, and personal computers that house private information. A 
person who converts another’s smartphone instantly gains access to the owner’s 
private data, which in and of itself tramples the owner’s expectation of privacy. 
Tailoring damage awards is therefore an effective way of tailoring the law 
to protect privacy interests. 
V. INCORPORATING PRIVACY IN PROPERTY THEORY 
In this part, we set out to place our privacy-based account within the 
broader framework of property theory,281 and explain how it interfaces with 
 
281 Notably, there is a lack of consensus among property theorists about the essential 
characteristics of the field. See Lee Anne Fennell, The Problem of Resource Access, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1471, 1477 (2013) (“Property theory today is alive with debate on core questions of entitlement design: 
whether property rules or liability rules should dominate, whether an exclusion- or thing-based 
vision of property should trump the bundle-of-rights metaphor, [or] whether fixed tenure menus 
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the three property visions that presently dominate the scholarly discourse. 
The first view can be termed “exclusion centrism,” as it puts the right to 
exclude at the epicenter of property law. The second view is widely known as 
the progressive property movement. It conceptualizes property as a 
constellation of institutions designed to bring about human flourishing. The 
third vision is known as the personhood theory of property. 
A. Property as the Right to Exclude 
The vision that puts the right to exclude at the center of the property world 
can be traced back to the English jurist William Blackstone, who famously 
described property law as “that sole and despotic dominion which one man 
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of 
the right of any other individual in the universe.”282 The Blackstonian 
conceptualization, while antiquated, continues to exert significant influence on 
modern-day property theorists.283 Echoing the essence of the Blackstonian view, 
Thomas Merrill famously proclaimed that “property means the right to exclude 
others from valued resources, no more and no less.”284 A similar understanding 
was espoused by James Penner, who wrote that the meaning of property can be 
fully accounted for via the rights to exclude and use.285 Other contemporary 
theorists who have taken more nuanced positions on the centrality of the right 
to exclude still clearly view exclusion as an essential property incident.286 
The right to exclude holds pride of place not only in the common law property 
system, but also in the civil-law tradition. In their comparative study of civil and 
common law property, Yun-chien Chang and Henry Smith observe that even 
though the two legal systems grew out of very different traditions and use 
different property concepts, “ownership under the civil law and fee simple 
ownership of land in the common law system (and for the most part the respective 
 
aid or impede efficiency . . . .”). Our selection of three theories as points of comparison is not 
intended to suggest that other property theories are less compelling, important, or insightful. 
282 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
283 Blackstone wrote more than this one sentence on property law, and some theorists have 
pointed out that the sentence may not accurately capture the essence of Blackstone’s views, and that 
the view that has come to be known as “Blackstonian” may not be Blackstone’s. See Carol M. Rose, 
Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 YALE L.J. 601, 602 (1998); David B. Schorr, How 
Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 103, 103 (2009). 
284 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 2, at 754. 
285 See PENNER, supra note 2, at 68 (asserting that “property rights can be fully explained using 
the concepts of exclusion and use”). 
286 See e.g., Balganesh, supra note 2, at 600 (emphasizing that, to be meaningful, the idea of 
property “must contain, at a minimum, some element of exclusion,” but noting that the objective of 
the article “is not to argue that the right to exclude is all that there is in property”). 
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notions of full ownership of personal property) coincide to a remarkable extent in 
their basic features: a possessory right to prevent invasions . . . .”287 
Economists, too, have placed the right to exclude at the very heart of the 
institution of property. For example, Harold Demsetz pointed out that a 
property regime that puts resources in the hands of a single owner and grants 
her expansive exclusion powers would cause a more efficient utilization of 
resources.288 Other economists have highlighted that the right to exclude is 
the key to the successful functioning of property markets.289 
Our privacy-based theory of property both endorses and rejects key parts 
of the owners’ right to exclude. While privacy interests demand strong 
protection for the exclusionary rights of owners, they do not demand an 
absolutist view. Rather, the strength of an owner’s right to exclude must 
reflect the strength of the privacy interest she seeks to protect. Where there 
is no plausible privacy interest to protect, there is no need to dogmatically 
protect the owner’s exclusion right. And where exclusion cannot protect 
privacy interests (such as where a neighbor’s use interferes with privacy), the 
owner’s privacy interest should not be downplayed. As we make clear 
throughout the Article, the law can and should privilege the owners’ rights to 
exclude over other interests when doing so is necessary to defend their private 
interests. So property owners should have strong exclusion powers as to 
assets, such as their homes, computers, and all tangible and nontangible 
repositories of private information. Yet our account also shows that 
unauthorized intrusions that do not implicate privacy violations should not 
be treated like intrusions that violate privacy. 
As David Dana and Nadav Shoked powerfully show in a new paper, the 
right to exclude has never been absolute and in many respects the exclusion 
powers of property owners are quite weak to begin with.290 Thus, while our 
account differs from the most absolutist version of exclusion-centrism, it fits 
better with extant and historic doctrine. 
B. The Progressive Property Movement 
Pioneered by Gregory Alexander, Eduardo Peñalver, Joseph Singer, and 
Laura Underkuffler, and joined by many other prominent scholars, the 
 
287 Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Civil Versus Common Law 
Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 3 (2012). 
288 See Demsetz, supra note 29, at 356 (1967) (noting that an owner, “by virtue of his power to 
exclude others,” has “incentives to utilize resources more efficiently”). 
289 See RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 48 (4th ed. 1984) (“Exchange cannot occur without property rights, and property 
rights require exclusion. Given such exclusion, the market can function as an auction system.”). 
290 David Dana & Nadav Shoked, Private Property’s Edges (a work in progress) (on file with authors). 
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progressive property movement presents a pluralistic view of property 
designed to accommodate and promote a myriad of incommensurable 
values.291 While the view advanced by progressive property scholars has much 
in common with the writings of the legal realists of the 1920s and 1930s, there 
are important differences between the two movements. The focus of legal 
realism was mainly conceptual, while the ambition of the progressive 
property movement is unabashedly normative: it calls for the furtherance of 
such values as civic responsibility, environmental stewardship, life, human 
flourishing, autonomy, freedom, and “individual and social well-being.”292 
The progressive property movement puts societal interests on par with those 
of property owners, asserting that the rights of property owners should bow 
down to broader societal needs and wants.293 The progressive property 
movement can therefore be characterized as decidedly nonindividualistic. It 
approaches property owners as members of a larger group, whose rights are 
not bats, but mere sticks of an imprecisely defined bundle.294 
At the same time, the progressive property movement joins legal realism in 
dismissing the possibility or desirability of a unified and consistent view of 
property. In endorsing a “pluralistic” vision of property,295 progressive property 
scholars explain that property is supposed to advance a wide range of values, 
ranging from “individual interests, wants, needs, desires, and preferences” to 
“social interests, such as environmental stewardship, civic responsibility, and 
aggregate wealth,” to general interests, such as “life and human flourishing, the 
protection of physical security, the ability to acquire knowledge and make choices, 
and the freedom to live one’s life on one’s own terms.”296 The movement’s 
statement explicitly posits that these values are incommensurable and therefore 
cannot be “analyzed through a single metric” or “[r]educe[d] . . . to one common 
currency.”297 Property problems cannot, therefore, be resolved by deduction 
or balancing; rather, they must be resolved by “reasoned deliberation” that 
reconciles the “incommensurable” through the use of “critical judgment, 
tradition, experience and discernment” that together add up to a method of 
 
291 See Alexander et al., supra note 16, at 744 (asserting that values implicated by property 
“cannot be adequately understood or analyzed through a single metric”). 
292 Id. at 743. 
293 See Rosser, supra note 45, at 145 (suggesting that the core ambition of the progressive 
property movement is “to recognize more exceptions to the default rights of an owner to exclude, 
or put differently, to expand recognition of the public’s interest in privately held property”). 
294 See Jonathan Klick & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of the Right to Exclude: An Empirical 
Assessment, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 934 (2017) (“The emergence of the progressive property 
movement has resurrected the bundle of rights conception of property and has put renewed pressure 
to scale back the right to exclude.”). 
295 See Alexander et al., supra note 16, at 743 (“Property implicates plural and incommensurable values.”). 
296 Id. 
297 Id. at 744. 
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“rational choice” that “include[s] non-deductive, non-algorithmic reflection” 
as well as other undefined elements.298 
Given the plurality of incommensurable values endorsed by the progressive 
property movement and the strong focus on human flourishing, nothing 
prevents champions of this view from adding privacy as a value that ought to be 
considered and respected. Indeed, few, if any, would deny that privacy is 
important to human flourishing and self-actualization. Thus, we can conjecture 
with high confidence that the progressive property movement would welcome 
the addition of privacy as a value that should shape property institutions. 
Where we part ways with progressive property scholars is in the way we 
balance privacy against other societal interests. While progressive property 
scholars proclaim a commitment to the principle of incommensurability, we 
believe that legal reasoning should strive to resolve legal problems in a fashion 
that yields predictable and uniform results. One aim in focusing on the privacy 
needs property owners is to contribute to predictability and uniformity; we seek 
rulings based on common and commensurable metrics. In granting strong 
property protection to property owners in protection of their privacy interests, 
we might therefore find ourselves outside the consensus of progressive property 
scholars who might privilege other societal interests on occasion. 
We are fully mindful of this incongruence between our theory and the 
ideology underlying the progressive property movement. Yet we feel that the 
property vision we portray throughout the Article can accommodate some of 
the central themes of the progressive property movement. Concretely, our 
conception is open to the possibility of expanding the access and use 
privileges of the public as long as doing so does not interfere with the owners’ 
privacy expectations. This position, while not fully consistent with the 
principles of the progressive property scholars, may mark an acceptable 
compromise for adherents of the movement. 
C. The Personhood Theory 
The personhood theory of property was developed by Margaret Radin,299 
based on Freidrich Hegel’s justification for private property.300 Importantly, Radin 
did not intend the personhood theory to be a comprehensive theory of property.301 
Margaret Radin notes that some objects “embody” the owner’s personality 
while others do not. Objects such as a family home or a wedding band are 
 
298 Id. 
299 See Radin, supra note 3. 
300 See HEGEL, supra note 3. 
301 See Gregory A. Alexander, Property and Pluralism, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1017, 1017 n.1 
(2011) (“[U]nlike welfarism, the personhood theory is not and does not purport to be a 
comprehensive theory of property . . . .”). 
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vital to a person’s identity, and so, she argues, are entitled to the highest level 
of property protection.302 By contrast, she argues that fungible assets are 
generally devoid of their owner’s personality.303 In some cases, Radin argues, 
owners develop personal attachments to assets, but the connection should not 
earn strong protection of the law as it is merely “fetishism.”304 
Radin does not deny that even fungible assets can and should enjoy the 
protections of property law.305 Thus, Radin does not argue that “personhood” 
can completely illuminate the contours of property law. Still, Radin powerfully 
argues that the degree of legal protection granted property rights should reflect 
differences in personal attachment.306 Radin argues that monetary damages 
should be the principal means of redress as to transgressions involving rights in 
fungible and impersonal assets.307 Likewise, highly personal assets should 
therefore receive stronger protection than impersonal assets; for instance, 
injunctive relief should be reserved to cases involving violations of property 
rights in assets infused with a high degree of the owner’s personality. 
We suggest an analogous strategy for calibrating degrees of protection. 
Like Radin, we do not view the value we seek to protect—privacy interests, 
in our case—to be the sole value protected by property law. But like Radin, 
we view the value as sufficiently important to serve as a good guideline for 
determining the amount of legal protection to offer. 
Obviously, the metric we use differs greatly from Radin’s—our benchmark is 
expectation of privacy while hers is level of personhood. As a result, in some 
instances our framework causes outcomes that are very different than Radin’s. 
For example, the personhood theory is predicated on the assumption that 
individuals need objects to express their inner-self, and, thus, achieve inner-
growth and self-actualization.308 Publicity through interaction between the inner-
self and the outside world as mediated by assets, is therefore a key component of 
the personhood theory. Our theory, by contrast, is rooted in concerns for privacy 
and the desire to conceal information from the world. The wedding ring is a very 
personal object which conveys one’s marital status to the world. Yet it is not 
 
302 See Radin, supra note 3, at 959-60 (listing “a wedding ring, a portrait, an heirloom, or a house” as 
examples of objects that “are closely bound up with personhood” and then arguing that by virtue of this 
fact, owners “should be accorded broad liberty with respect to control over that ‘thing’”). 
303 See id. at 986-88 (suggesting two levels of property protection, one for personal objects and 
one for fungible possessions). 
304 Id. at 968-70. 
305 See id. at 986 (recognizing that fungible assets should receive protection, albeit less than 
personal items). 
306 Id. (“[T]he personhood perspective generates a hierarchy of entitlements: The more closely 
connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement.”). 
307 Id. at 988. 
308 Id. at 957 (“The premise underlying the personhood perspective is that to achieve proper self-
development—to be a person—an individual needs some control over resources in the external environment.”). 
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accompanied by a high degree of privacy expectation. A bank statement, by 
contrast, may be highly impersonal, yet be viewed as intensely private. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we sought to highlight the important relationship between 
privacy and property and reinstate privacy as a decisive factor in determining 
the appropriate scope of property protection. Once upon a time, privacy 
considerations animated property law and policy. Gradually, however, that 
slipped away from the attention of scholars, who, instead, have increasingly 
focused their academic investigations on information privacy. As we have shown 
in the Article, though, outside of the scholarly realm, in real-world practice, the 
connection between privacy and property interests continues to be strong. 
In addition to emphasizing the conceptual nexus between privacy and 
property, we have proposed several ways property doctrine can be reshaped to 
give stronger protection to privacy interests. We have contended that refocusing 
property law and policy around the value of privacy will pay dividends not only 
to lawmakers but also to property theorists. The privacy-centered theory of 
property that we have developed in this Article has the potential to transform 
longstanding debates and disagreements about the appropriate scope of property 
owners’ right to exclude and right to use, as well as to their remedial options. 
Before concluding, we would like to emphasize once more that we do not 
argue that privacy is the sole consideration that should animate property law. 
Nor do we maintain that it ought to be the most important one. As we have 
strained to clarify throughout the article, our claim is more modest: that 
privacy aspects should be given greater weight in property law than they 
currently receive. In a society that constantly strives for more information, 
one should have a sphere where one can choose to be left alone. 
